The debate over legalization vs decriminalization of prostitution is in the public domain with reports that the National Commission for Women has recommended legalization to the Supreme Court appointed panel for rehabilitation of sex workers. The panel, formed in 2011 when the Supreme Court suo motu converted a criminal appeal relating to a murder of a sex worker into a PIL, is in the process of consulting various stakeholders.
The mandate of this panel was to recommend measures for the rehabilitation of sex workers who wished to leave sex work, and conducive conditions for sex workers who wish to continue working in the profession.
Magnitude of the issue
Estimates of the number of women engaged in prostitution have increased over the years. In 1997, a report of the National Commission of Women put it at 2 million, in 2004, a study sponsored by the Ministry of Women and Child Development estimated it to be 3 million of which 36% were children and a 2013 report on sex trafficking by Dasra, a philanthropic foundation estimated that about 20 million women were engaged in the profession. The 2013 report showed that 80% of these women are victims of sex trafficking. Most disturbingly, out of the estimated 16 million women who are trafficked, 6 million are children under 18 years of age. There is however no official estimates available since 2004 of the prevalence of prostitution.
According to the 2013 report, the prevalence of prostitution is highest in states such as Arunachal Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Goa, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Nagaland, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal as well Union Territories like Chandigarh and Daman and Diu.
Multiple factors lead to women becoming prostitutes, the most common of which are illiteracy, lack of vocational skills, economic distress, migration, desertion by spouse, ill-treatment by parents and family tradition. Most work in miserable conditions leading to different types of diseases, depression and hopelessness. They are also faced with daily violence, constant police harassment and societal ostracisation. Given the informal economy in which they work, they also find it difficult to open bank accounts, get insurance or identification cards.
The threat of HIV/AIDS also looms large – reports say prevalence of HIV/AIDS among this category ranged between 2% and 38% in India (globally it is about 12%). However, due to their ambiguous legal status, they are unable to get access to basic services including healthcare, education and bank accounts.
Not prohibited, but is it permitted?
According to the Immoral Trafficking Prevention Act, 1956 (ITP Act), “prostitution” is defined as the sexual exploitation of persons for commercial purposes. While it does not prohibit sex work per se, it imposes penalty for keeping a brothel, soliciting, pimping and plying the trade near a public place such as places of worship, schools and hospitals.
In 2006, India moved towards decriminalization of prostitution when it attempted to amend the ITP Act by deleting the provision that penalized soliciting and adding a provision that penalized clients of sex workers who were trafficked victims. However the Bill lapsed with the dissolution of the 14th Lok Sabha. These provisions were not well thought through given that it did not clarify the confusion about the profession’s basic legal status since provisions such as penalizing clients, prostitution in brothels and public places made it difficult for prostitutes to practice their trade legitimately.
In most of Asia, Africa and parts of the US, prostitution is illegal. Some states in Australia and New Zealand have decriminalized prostitution (no penalty for prostitutes) while Sweden, Norway, Iceland and Nepal penalize the client on the ground that prostitution is an aspect of male violence towards women. Prostitution is legal in most countries in Latin America and Europe and in some parts of the US.
The evidence however is not clear either ways. Some studies do show a correlation between legitimizing sex work and a drop in violence targeting sex workers while others show that it has resulted in increase in human trafficking.
Decriminalising – the way forward
As we re-open the debate about prostitution, Legalization in India may not improve matters given India’s lax law enforcement mechanism as well as cultural milieu. The safest option at this point may be decriminalizing the trade so that sex work per se is not legalised but sex workers are not harassed and exploited by the police, brothel owners and pimps (middlemen). It would also reduce barriers to essential health services, education, bank accounts, insurance, voter identity cards. The government needs to play a crucial role by providing credible rehabilitation options if any of them want to opt out.
The recently enacted Criminal Laws (Amendment) Act, 2013 includes provision to penalize trafficking for any purpose. However, the government needs to strengthen its efforts to combat trafficking by dedicating resources, strengthening capacity of existing institutions and encouraging other stakeholders to leverage their own resources and expertise to address this serious problem. Considering the cross-regional and interdisciplinary nature of trafficking, there is a need to build and provide sustainable support to networks that bring together various stakeholders linking source and destination areas, frame common objectives and ensure accountability and effective delivery on the ground.
Tags: Criminal Laws, decriminalization, decriminalization of prostitution, government in India, human trafficking, India, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, indian polity, legalization, Ministry, National Commission for Women, NCW, political parties, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polity of india, polityinindia, rehabilitation, sex trafficking, sex work, trafficking, WCD
I have a recent piece in the Indian Express on the misplaced prioritisation on bringing back black money. The op-ed can be found here. The piece is reproduced below.
Suppose you are the government of a country badly in need of gold, but with only Rs 100 with which to get some.
You have two options on how to spend the money you have at your disposal for this purpose: Option one, try and tap the vast and readily available gold deposits in your country or option two, send your generals out to wage war against a neighbouring country rumoured to have large quantities of gold in circulation already. The first option would require the government to build durable capacity to extract the gold. It would require skill-building and long-term investments with the expectation of long-term gains. In short, there would be few short-term political gains.
The second would require sending some of your most able generals out to war. You know the war is going to be long and costly. You are unsure of how much gold you will get even after you win the war, but rumours suggest a possibility of acquiring vast quantities that would instantly make your country rich. Also, war-mongering has its benefits: It riles up people and unites them behind a common enemy. A chance of winning the war would ensure immediate and long-term political success. And you would not need to do the hard work of building state capacity at home. It sounds like a better bet, except that the probability of a win is unknown.
In the choice between spending Rs 100 on either building a more capable and effective tax administration or waging war against black money, we seem to have opted almost exclusively for option two. In doing so, we are sacrificing the historic need and opportunity to reform tax administration within India. Consider the facts: We rank 158th globally with regard to ease of paying taxes. Our tax-GDP ratio is hovering around 5.5 per cent, among the lowest in the world, and has not kept pace with recent growth rates. This points to a lack of investment in state capacity commensurate with a rapidly growing and changing economy. Less than 5 per cent of our population pays progressive income tax, while everyone pays the more inegalitarian indirect taxes every time they consume. This also points to low state capacity, especially since indirect taxes are relatively easier to collect. Consequently, much of our population does not feel the direct burden of taxation. In the long term, this dilutes the level of accountability demanded from the state. The power to demand greater oversight of government expenditure is critical in any democracy.
The world over, developed democracies keep making continuous but major reforms to tax administration. Countries such as the UK, US, Germany, Australia and Sweden have made important changes to their tax administration systems in the areas of taxpayer registration, processing customer information, information collection about taxable transactions, and investment in research. In India, the Tax Administration Reform Commission has already made a number of important recommendations to systematically reform the tax administrative machinery in line with global best practices. Among other suggestions, it recommends the establishment of an independent evaluation office to continuously review tax administration and suggest areas of reform. The TARC has put forward a review of global best practices in each area of tax administration which, if implemented, would substantially improve the collection and administration of taxes.
The implementation of these and other related reforms are urgently required, and they are a long-term investment for the benefit of the country. While it is important to catch tax evaders who have stashed money abroad, it is perhaps more important to collect taxes from somewhat more than 5 per cent of the resident population. A country with low state capacity such as ours cannot afford to focus equally on both goals. A prioritisation has to be made and, so far, in public discourse, we seem to have opted for an option that holds the illusory promise of windfall gain rather than building durable state institutions.
The writer is with NIPFP, Delhi, and ‘The Indian Express’
Tags: black money, government in India, India, india as an evolving polity, india ease of doing business, Indian democracy, Indian government, indian polity, political parties, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polity of india, polityinindia, tax evasion
My paper proposing a framework for Parliamentary Oversight in India has been published in the NUJS Law Review (link). A brief description of the paper:
The need for a strong monitoring mechanism of the Executive in India has been made clearer by recent allegations of corruption against high-ranking officials of the central government. The Indian Parliament is the ideal institution to perform such a monitoring function through oversight of the central executive. The Executive in India is directly accountable to the Parliament. Making oversight by Parliament stronger and more effective would therefore increase the accountability of the Executive. Additionally, an increased oversight role would allow for greater policy inputs from Parliament to the Executive. It would also increase the general level of expertise within Parliament by making parliamentarians more technocratic and giving them greater avenues for specialization in different aspects of policymaking. This has held true in varying degrees in different countries as examined in this paper. Enacting a law that formalizes mechanisms of oversight within Parliament, especially within the committee system, can create such a framework in India. The central focus of a strong oversight framework is the system of parliamentary committees. Reinvigorating existing committees by giving them greater autonomy, clearer powers and research support are central tenets of the proposals made in this paper. Along with restructuring parliamentary committees, the incentive structure for Indian parliamentarians to conduct oversight is also examined, and proposals are suggested to ensure they perform their oversight function effectively. Such a law should reshape the way Parliamentary business is conducted with a view to holding government accountable, while at the same time allowing the central executive to function independently, and with greater efficiency.”
Tags: government in India, India, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, indian polity, judiciary, law and order, legal system, Parliament, Parliamentary oversight, policy in india, political parties, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polity of india, polityinindia, Supreme Court
The Supreme Court recently passed a controversial judgment condemning ‘automatic’ arrests by police in dowry harassment cases against husbands and in-laws. The judgment has received a mixed response. While its supporters praise the Court’s strong statement against misuse of this law by women, others raise concerns over the rights and safety of victim women. While the Court rightly asks for the correct implementation of criminal procedures to avoid harassment by misuse of law, its lack of a simultaneous emphasis on the need for protection of women is problematic.
The judgment speaks of the duties of police officers while making arrests and applies to cases beyond the context of cruelty against women. Thus, one way to understand the ratio of the judgment is to look at it as a criminal procedure case divorced from its gender context. The Court merely reminds police officers of their duty under the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) to exercise discretion while arresting even in non-bailable and cognizable offences and to do away with the attitude “to arrest first and then proceed with the rest”. Instead of mechanically making arrests on receiving an allegation, the police should first arrive at a reasonable satisfaction as to the genuineness of the allegation based on some investigation. Under the Cr.P.C., for offences with punishment of seven or less years, like the provision on cruelty in dispute here, the police can arrest without a warrant only when it is satisfied that arrest is necessary for reasons such as preventing tampering with evidence, preventing threat to witnesses, and preventing commission of further offence. An absolute non-exercise of discretion, whether by mechanically arresting or not arresting, is problematic and may cause unnecessary harassment and humiliation to the arrested person. The judgment requires police officers to forward to the Magistrate not only their reasons for arrest, but also reasons for their decision not to arrest, in the latter case within two weeks from the date of institution of the case. Failure to follow these guidelines may render police officers liable for both departmental action and contempt of court proceedings.
While the operative part of the judgment is written largely in such criminal jurisprudence terms, presenting the judgment in this gender-neutral manner will rob it of its true context and hide its possible implications. Even while the direction is to police officers, the Court is more concerned about harassment by “disgruntled wives” than by the police. The Court emphasizes how women are misusing the criminal provision that was intended to protect them from cruelty by husbands or his relatives, and causing harassment through arrests not only of the husband, but also his old or distant relatives, whether male or female. The Court also notes that marriage is a revered institution in India and seems to lament the increase in matrimonial disputes in the country.
The exclusive focus on misuse instead of use of the provision makes the apparently harmless verdict reiterating the criminal procedural law a questionable and unbalanced one. While the misuse of anti-dowry provisions may be common, but even more widespread is the incidence of dowry-related violence. In its attempt to “maintain a balance between individual liberty and societal order”, the Court totally ignores the concerns of women who may actually be victims of harassment. Patriarchal norms normalizing domestic violence, lack of support for women who fight against such violence and the private domain within which the abuse takes place already make legal remedies difficult to access for many women. In this context, valid concerns were raised around the judgment’s implications for a woman deciding whether or not to use criminal law to her rescue and for the safety of a woman who decides to use criminal law but is not able to procure arrest of the accused persons.
There is a need to take on board concerns both regarding protection of women from domestic violence and regarding harassment caused by arrests of falsely accused persons. While the Supreme Court takes care of the latter, it ignores the former. As a matter of fact, the law already provides this protection in the form of the Domestic Violence Act (DVA). The definition of “domestic violence” under the Act covers physical, mental and economic abuse and includes violence related to dowry demands. It further places a duty on a police officer who receives a complaint of domestic violence to inform the aggrieved woman of her rights to receive protection under the DVA. Thus, even where the police may not arrest the accused persons immediately, they may still assist the complainant woman to use the DVA machinery and seek protection and other reliefs.
While the Court reiterates Cr.P.C. provisions to curtail harassment by misuse of dowry laws, it surprisingly misses out a mention of DVA that can simultaneously be used to provide protection to abused women. The police officers need to be reminded of their duty under both these laws. One can hope that this slip by the apex Court will not result in dilution of the actual exercise of their duty under the other law.
Tags: Gender, government in India, India, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, indian polity, infrastructure, judiciary, law and order, legal system, police, policy in india, political parties, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polity of india, polityinindia, Supreme Court
I have a co-authored post on the reforming the FDI regulatory framework in India on Ajay Shah’s blog here. The post was published on April 21, 2014, and has been co-authored by me, Ajay Shah, and Arjun Rajagopal. The post is being reproduced below.
Capital controls against FDI in aviation: An example of bad governance in India
FDI in aviation was liberalised by the Reserve Bank of India on September 21, 2012 through a change in the Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Security by a Person Resident outside India) Regulations, 2000 (link). Following that change, private players began putting together a number of complex transactions between Indian and foreign companies such as Jet-Etihad, AirAsia-Tata, and Tata-Singapore Airlines.
On November 20, 2013, the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) revised its `Civil Aviation Requirements’ or “CAR” (CAR 4.1.5 to 4.1.16) to state that a domestic airline company cannot enter into an agreement with a foreign investing entity (including foreign airlines) that may give such foreign entity a right to control the management of the domestic operator ( link). This change in regulations has major consequences for some of the transactions which are in progress.
There are two important deficiencies in this action by DGCA:
- The CAR makes repeated mention of the requirement of control, without clarifying what the term `control’ means. This creates legal risk for transacting parties.
- No rationale has been offered to justify the use of the coercive power of the State via the CAR; no estimates of the costs or benefits of this regulatory action have been provided.
What does `control’ mean?
Rule 4.1.8 of the CAR (link) states:
A Scheduled Air Transport Service/Domestic Scheduled Passenger Airline shall not enter into an agreement with a foreign investing institution or a foreign airline, which may give such foreign investing institution or foreign airlines or others on behalf of them, the right to control the management of the domestic operator.
However, the `right to control the management’ has not been defined. This lack of clarity is compounded by two other regulatory requirements: (a) the directors appointed by the foreign entity cannot exceed more than one-third of the total (CAR 4.1.7), and (b) the substantial ownership and effective control of a domestic operator has to be vested in Indian nationals (CAR 3.1).
The new requirements must mean that `the right to control the management’ involves a form of control over and above these two earlier requirements, but no definition of that form of control is offered. Such lack of precision in drafting of laws results in increased legal risk and should be avoided.
Lack of transparency
When the coercive power of the State is wielded by the executive, this should be accompanied by appropriate checks and balances. Good practice in regulatory governance requires that when regulators wish to make changes to regulations, and thus affect the rights of private parties, the regulators must furnish reasons for making those changes. This increases transparency, predictability, and accountability.
In the case of investments, an investor who commits resources would want an element of control in order to ensure his money is not stolen or wasted. A substantial investment in a company is thus often accompanied by rights regarding management and control of the company. If a regulatory requirement interferes with these rights of investors, the onus is on the regulator to explain why. The changes to the CAR affect the rights of investors and potential investors in the aviation industry, but DGCA has not furnished any reasons for its revisions.
Regulatory actions must not be arbitrary acts of God. They must be steeped in the rule of law. The Draft Indian Financial Code, when enacted, will ensure financial sector regulators make qualitatively better regulations by blocking these kinds of mistakes. All draft regulations will have to be accompanied by reasons for the proposed regulations, as well as a cost-benefit analysis of the proposed regulations. These will be made available for public comment, before the final regulations are adopted. This regulation-making process will result in clearer and better regulations, and will enhance the legitimacy of the regulations and of regulators. The adoption of a similar process by DGCA would have led to a better outcome.
Barriers to international economic engagement: A strategic view
Consider trade barriers. The Indian State has the power to introduce customs duties. A number of government bodies undoubtedly have a major stake in the design of customs duties, and may even have critical expertise in the matter. Nonetheless, the power to introduce and modify customs duties is vested in a single authority — the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Textiles, for example, has no power to change the customs duty on imported cloth. This is a healthy arrangement: The Ministry of Finance is responsible for maintaining a unified strategic outlook on the question of trade barriers. The Ministry of Textiles can engage with the Ministry of Finance and suggest changes in tariffs, but responsibility for formulating and promulgating a coherent policy ultimately rests exclusively with Ministry of Finance.
This same strategy is required in the field of capital controls. If multiple regulators or government departments set about writing capital controls, we will have a balkanised mess.
Indeed, the current capital controls based framework is just such a balkanised mess. In the absence of a single governing law for foreign investment, a number of agencies have prescribed foreign investor regulations. The types of capital control restrictions and their rationale can be outlined as:
- Entry restrictions by financial regulators such as RBI and Ministry of Finance, usually to promote monetary policy and financial stability (under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, but not restricted to it);
- Entry restrictions imposed by DIPP and Ministry of Finance on grounds of national security (may include consideration of factors listed under FEMA as well); and
- Regulatory restrictions (including on control and ownership) imposed by sectoral regulators.
This multiplicity of regulations also leads to uncertainty of regulatory objectives. Investors have no idea of what criteria is used to assess their investments, and grant them business permissions. It is important to recognize that the justifications used to impose regulatory restrictions for relying on the distinctions between private and public, or domestic and foreign entities, is that these distinctions are reasonable proxies for the other characteristics (national security, systemic risk) that are a valid basis for differential treatment. As in so many areas of regulation, the misapplication of easy proxies for characteristics that are difficult to assess becomes a glaring reminder of regulatory uncertainty. It is important that regulatory objectives be identified clearly in relevant statues and regulations.
In addition to the legal and regulatory uncertainty created by such a multiplicity of regulators and regulations, the regulations themselves may violate India’s obligations under various multilateral and bilateral investment treaties: Many, if not, most such agreements provide for national treatment of investment once it has been allowed to enter the domestic market. Regulators should not be allowed to impose regulatory restrictions after foreign investment has already entered the domestic market. Under this principle of competitive neutrality, there should be no difference in the conditions imposed on the State Bank of India and those imposed on Etihad, when they invest in Jet Airways.
This requires more than administrative changes. A reform of the legalframework is essential. For example, the restrictions in the CAR appear to be grounded in the expansive powers granted to DGCA under the Aircraft Act, 1934. Section 5 of the Act (link) states:
Power of Central Government to make rules. – (1) Subject to the provisions of section 14, the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules regulating the manufacture, possession, use, operation, sale, import or export of any aircraft or class of aircraft and for securing the safety of aircraft operation.
Those same powers could ground preferential treatment in other areas of regulation. To the extent that other regulatory bodies with responsibilities for other sectors have similar powers, those sectors too are vulnerable to violations of the principle of competitive neutrality.
The report of the FSLRC proposes a cleaner, clearer regulatory framework for foreign investment, one which is consistent with these obligations. Section 2.5 of the report states:
The Commission envisages a regulatory framework where governance standards for regulated entities will not depend on the form of organisation of the financial firm or its ownership structure. This will yield ‘competitive neutrality’. In this framework, the regulatory treatment of companies, co-operatives and partnerships; public and private financial firms; anddomestic and foreign firms, will be identical.
The draft Indian Financial Code, which encodes the principles articulated in the report, explicitly requires all regulators to maintain competitive neutrality while framing regulations. Section 84 (Principles of consumer protection) and section 141 (Principles of prudential regulation) contain the following identical language:
[C]ompetition in the markets for financial products and financial services is desirable in the interests of consumers and therefore… there should be competitive neutrality in the treatment of financial service providers;
This will ensure that sectoral regulators in the financial sector will not be able to discriminate against foreign and domestic firms/investment.
Pending the introduction of the Code, it would be helpful to incorporate its underlying principles into the existing regulatory framework. For example, the BJP has suggested that they will block FDI in retail but they will remove all capital controls against FDI in other sectors. Any government wishing to carry out such a change would need all capital controls be defined at only one place, where a single policy decision is taken. After this, it should not be possible for any other department of government or a regulatory agency to introduce capital controls.
The required single-window system should have the following characteristics:
- A comprehensive definition of foreign investment;
- A rule-of-law based mechanism for the government to allow/prohibit entry of foreign investment in specific sectors;
- A single regulatory barrier for foreign investment before it can enter the domestic market. Currently FIPB is an example of such a barrier;
- Clear documentation of approval of foreign investment that must be binding on all government authorities;
- Clear enumeration of reasons for which foreign investment can be restricted, and who can impose these restrictions (without any catch-all provisions like “for any other reason”);
- A positive obligation on the government to ensure competitive neutrality, OR a restriction preventing the government from discriminating against foreign investment once the investment has been allowed to enter India; and
- A review mechanism where foreign investors whose investment has either (a) been rejected, or (b) been subjected to discriminatory treatment compared to a domestic investor, can seek redressal.
There is great outrage in India today, against a capricious State that is a major source of risk for firms. These failures on capital controls are one important component of that problem. It is the right of politicians to interfere with international economic integration – e.g. to block FDI in retail or not or to have tariffs on import of apples or not. But there should be a single-barrier where this political decision is made.
Tags: capital controls, foreign investment, government in India, India, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, indian polity, infrastructure, judiciary, law and order, legal system, policy in india, political parties, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polity of india, polityinindia, public administration, regulatory framework, regulatory governance, trade
This post was first published by Humorlessindianlawyer.blogspot.in on April 8, 2014.
living in India with a Parliament that makes laws, an executive that implements these laws and a court system that interprets these laws. Now, imagine Parliament making the following law:
Right to regulate all Economic Activities Completely Act, 2014
Section 1. This Act applies to all of India. Except J&K, because we don’t feel like it.
Section 2. The central government will have the power to ban any economic activity if: (a) it is useful, (b) people can make money from it, (c) it increases the work of government officers, or (d) the concerned officer is in a bad mood that morning.
Section 3. Yes, we really mean business. This time.
Section 4. Notwithstanding thereto anything therefore whereas provided that “economic activity” includes sand mining, coal mining, writing books or, buying, selling, making, eating, drinking, consuming, excreting, advertising any product or service, but does not include the buying or selling of votes.
Section 5. The central government can make rules for the purpose of implementing this Act.
Section 6. This Act will become applicable on the date the central government notifies it in our super cool official gazette. The central government can selectively notify some sections of this Act on days it rains.
some super-zealous government officer notifies Section 5 of the Act, but forgets to notify any other section. So out of the entire Act, only Section 5 is in force and applicable law. Thank god, you may say. But the central government goes ahead and starts making rules banning sand mining.
But how? Sections 2 and 4, the two most bad-ass sections have not even been notified yet! People challenge this stupid Act and the rule made under it in the courts.
Dreams get real
In 1988, the Indian Supreme Court made this nightmarish dystopia a reality. In Ajay Canu vs. Union of India the Supreme Court was hearing an appeal from the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. The petitioner had challenged a rule by the state of Andhra Pradesh that required all persons driving motor cycles and scooters to wear helmets.
One of the issues the petitioner raised was that this rule was made under Section 85-A of the Motor Vehicles Act that had not yet been enforced (the other issue was that the Act violated the freedom of movement under the Constitution). Without the section in the parent Act coming into force, no rule, surely could be made under that section? The court swatted away this contention in a majestic display of its wisdom.
The Court pointed to Section 91 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 91 gives the government the power to make rules for implementing the Motor Vehicles Act (Importantly, while Section 85-A had not been enforced, Section 91 had been). The Court said it would proceed on the assumption that Section 85-A had not been enforced. However, even if it were not enforced, Section 91 gives the power to the government to make the rules requiring drivers of motorcycles to wear helmets!
Lets re-state this: The Section that gives the power to require drivers of motor cycles to wear helmets has not been enforced. The Section that gives the government the power to make rules for implementing this section is in force. Without the specific power, the rule-making power is useless, one would think. Section 91 specifically states “The … government may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this chapter…“. And yet, the Supreme Court says it is ok to make rules enforcing a Section that is not even applicable law yet!.
Even worse, this case concerned a challenge to the fundamental right to movement. The Supreme Court held that the rules made by the Andhra Pradesh government did not violate this fundamental right. The net effect of this decision is that the government can impose restrictions on fundamental rights (including, on the freedom to carry on trade and commerce, say, by banning sand mining) by passing a law, and notifying only one section that states that the government can make rules to implement this Act!!
This of course, works brilliantly if you are the government. Suppose the law that is used to do all this provides a right to challenge the government order. Simple. Don’t notify the useless giving-losers-a-chance-to-whine section, and you are good to go!
Tags: central government, government in India, India, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, indian national congress, indian polity, judiciary, law and order, policy in india, political parties, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polity of india, polityinindia, Supreme Court, The central government
Today’s Mint carries an article on how political parties have increasingly moved to a system of “localised” manifestoes for the 2014 general election. This is a significant trend that began with Aam Aadmi Party’s Delhi election campaign where it released local manifestoes for each assembly constituency (link). The BJP followed suit in Delhi, and according to news reports, is planning to do the same for the national elections (link). The Congress under Rahul Gandhi is sticking to one manifesto, but its leaders are making the right noises about making manifesto preparation a participatory process.
At the same time, the Election Commission of India has recently started regulating election manifestoes under its Model Code of Conduct pursuant to a Supreme Court judgement. It has stated that election manifestoes should explain the “rationale” for its proposals and how these proposals will be funded. Both these developments, (a) the localization of manifestoes, and (b) the regulation of manifestoes are significant markers for electoral democracy in India.
2 Local Manifestoes
Election manifestoes represent a charter of goals that political parties will strive to achieve if voted into power. The adoption of a system of local manifestoes is both exciting as a tool of political participation, and worrying if one pauses to think of how the aggregation of local manifestoes will work to inform a national government.
On the one hand, this localization process is heartening. Indian political parties seem to be involving the electorate directly in the preparation of manifestoes, and paying greater attention to their voices. This is a marked departure from a process where, as Mint states, “a group of leaders would discuss and determine the content of the manifesto.” AAP has clearly brought in an innovative idea for running political campaigns, and it is being tested by both BJP and the Congress. It makes manifestoes more relevant, and increases (to at least some extent), the level of accountability of elected leaders as voters may have greater recollection of a local manifesto than a national one. If developed properly, this system of local manifestoes could also help make elections more issue-based, albeit at a level where local issues are more relevant. It could also improve the transmission of political messages from voters to politicians by giving the latter a clear charter to try and implement, rather than be a passive responder to powerful local interest groups.
However, while democracy is about representation, but it is also about leadership. The benefit of a centralized process of making a manifesto is that a political party takes an a priori call on what it stands for, and wishes to achieve. This manifesto can then be tempered once voters respond to the manifesto during the campaign. However, here the process of political communication emphasizes leadership and vision. It allows political parties to communicate what they stand for, rather than just try and respond to every constituency’s preference. Incorporating a process where manifesto preparation is completely decentralized creates a risk of parties losing sight of any non-negotiable principles they may stand for.
Obviously, both these arguments assume that it political parties will follow only one of these two approaches, while most political campaigns are likely a blend of both central decision-making and feedback from local constituencies. And given the inordinate amount of power leaders of political parties enjoy, a decentralized process may be the best thing to have occurred in electoral democracy recently. “Garibi hatao” was enormously successful for Indira Gandhi, but it is debatable whether she would have come up with it if the commnication of voter preferences were better. Ditto for NDA’s unsuccessful “India shining” campaign.
Lastly, this argument pre-supposes that political parties and voters take manifestoes seriously! It is in this context that the recent judgement of the Supreme Court (linked above), and the consequent actions of the Election Commission are so significant.
3 Regulation of election manifestoes
The Election Commission has brought election manifestoes under the Model Code of Conduct. In para 3 of “VIII Guidelines on Election Manifestos” of the MCC, the EC states:
(i) The election manifesto shall not contain anything repugnant to the ideals and principles enshrined in the Constitution and further that it shall be consistent with the letter and spirit of other provisions of Model Code of Conduct. (ii) The Directive Principles of State Policy enshrined in the Constitution enjoin upon the State to frame various welfare measures for the citizens and therefore there can be no objection to the promise of such welfare measures in election manifestos. However, political parties should avoid making those promises which are likely to vitiate the purity of the election process or exert undue influence on the voters in exercising their franchise. (iii) In the interest of transparency, level playing field and credibility of promises, it is expected that manifestos also reflect the rationale for the promises and broadly indicate the ways and means to meet the financial requirements for it. Trust of voters should be sought only on those promises which are possible to be fulfilled.
Para (iii) is extremely significant. It requires political parties, for the first time, to (a) explain the reason why the political party is making a particular promise, and (b) explain what resources, including finances it will utilise to fulfill these promises. This is extremely important for the following reasons:
- Political parties will have to explain why they want to do something. Ensuring they give proper reasons for wanting to do something will make it more difficult to throw in mindless freebies without any justification. Also, it will reduce room for ideological inconsistencies. Since they have to provide rationales for every promise, it will lead to greater scrutiny of the political party’s overall philosophy, and therefore require parties to think harder about what to put in the manifesto. Lastly, it will reduce incentives to throw in a laundry list of promises without any intention of fulfilling them. Manifestoes have to be readable documents and they have to help the political campaign project an easily communicable message. To ensure this is maintained, the process of picking what to promise will become more selective once the reasons for the promises also have to be included.
- Political parties will have to explain what financial resources will be used to achieve its promises. Even if at present they have to only “broadly indicate” how they wil do so, it is a milestone in nudging political parties towards being fiscally responsible. If a political party wants to spend 25% of the country’s budget on defence, it will have to show how it intends to also deliver on its promise of giving everyone free hospitals, food, television sets, electricity, water and the like at the same time. Even if the average voter is not concerned with these issues to start off, it will lead to greater expert and media scrutiny of election promises. We can at least begin to aspire for substantive debates on poll-promises rather than a game of upmanship based on who can promise how much.
Tags: aam aadmi party, AAP, BJP, Congress, election 2014, Election commission, Election Commission of india, election manifesto, government in India, India, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, indian national congress, indian polity, judiciary, law and order, model code of conduct, National security, national security FDI, policy in india, political parties, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polity of india, polityinindia
This post is an opinion piece on Arundhati Roy’s recent open letter regarding the banning of the book “The Hindus”
Whatever your views on the merits of Penguin’s actions in withdrawing Wendy Doniger’s book, ‘The Hindus’, it is hard to read Arundhati Roy’s open letter to Penguin and not cringe. In her letter Roy does what she does best. She is undoubtedly extraordinarily gifted when it comes to constructing beautiful prose, but sadly when it comes to writing on issues that affect the wider public, it seems beautiful prose is the extent of her gifts.
A closer analysis of her beautiful prose reveals that she has not really thought about how hypocritical she is being [or as many suspect, that she is a rather big hypocrite]. If she is in fact as deeply concerned with Penguin’s failure to protect its authors as she claims to be, the logical course of action would be for her to immediately drop them as her publisher. She would hit them where it hurts the most- their pockets; and if she is truly as non- materialistic as she has long claimed, the monetary loss that she would face should be of no significance. But for reasons best know to Roy that has not happened.
Instead of putting her money where her mouth is, Roy insists that Penguin is obligated to fight on behalf of everyone that has a problem with people demanding a ban on the book. According to Roy, Penguin and the people that work there should not only pay vast legal fees to fight for her cause, but also risk imprisonment under the Indian Penal Code as it exists- all while she does nothing beyond writing a letter.
Nor does Roy help her case by somehow connecting a settlement made by an international publishing house after years of litigation with the potential rise of “fascists” in India’s next general election (which I think it is reasonably safe to assume refers to the fact that Narendra Modi and the BJP might attain a majority). How Roy thinks convincing Penguin that taking up this issue is unlikely to endear it to what might possibly be the next government might encourage Penguin is unclear. I would argue that it is more likely to discourage Penguin to do as she asks, than it is to encourage it (assuming for the sake of argument that Roy is right in her thesis about the ‘fascists’).
Personally, I agree that the book should be available to the public and that those that have a problem with it should not read it. But, that said, the law in India allows people to object to the content of books and Penguin has to operate within the bounds of the law. It is not incumbent on anyone, much less on a business run for profit to fund legal battles for changing the law (and in fact, there is a strong argument to be made for the fact that large publishing houses should not be throwing cash into legal battles with the express aim of determining to what extent their actions can be regulated). As a prominent citizen and a veteran of taking on the State, Roy is far better placed to campaign for whatever change in the law she feels is needed than almost anyone else.
Why she seems to be shying away from doing so is anyone’s guess- and till she actually walks the talk, her letter is no more than the piteous bleating of a hypocrite.
Tags: government in India, India, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, indian polity, judiciary, law and order, National security, national security FDI, policy in india, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polity of india, polityinindia
This post has been written by Mr. Pratik Datta.
Present Indian laws ’prohibit’ foreign direct investment (FDI) in railways (other than mass rapid transport system). Of late there has been growing expectation that the Indian Government might allow 100% FDI in construction and maintenance of railway projects (but not in operations). Suddenly the optimism seems to have yielded to apprehensions of ’national security’ concerns (link). These concerns reportedly stem out of potential Chinese investment in Indian railways. India and China have long standing border disputes. The deep penetration of the Indian railways into some remote border areas seem to be bothering the Government. But is this apprehension justified? Do other countries restrict foreign investment based on ’national security’ concerns? Is there no other option but to prohibit foreign investment in railways? These are some of the questions that I will try to answer in this post.
Let’s take the example of US. Since World War II, US has traditionally been an ardent advocate of reduced restrictions on foreign investments. However, at different points of time, specific concerns over national security have shaped US policies on foreign investment. For instance, in 1970s, the US Congress had growing concerns about the increasing foreign investment into US from OPEC countries. This led to the establishment of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the US (CFIUS) in 1975 to oversee the national security implications of foreign investment. In 1988, amidst concerns over acquisition of some US companies by Japanese firms, the Congress approved the Exon-Florio provision that granted the President the power to block cross-border mergers with, or acquisition and takeovers of, certain US companies that might threaten national security.
Subsequently, the 9/11 attacks led to the passage of the Patriot Act, 2001 which declared certain sectors as ’critical infrastructure’ (including transportation) necessary for ’national defense, continuity of government, economic prosperity, and quality of life in the United States ’. The following year, the power to identify ’critical infrastructures’ was transferred to the Department of Homeland Security under the Homeland Security Act, 2002. In 2006, the proposed purchase of the US port operations of British-owned Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company by Dubai Port World fuelled much discontent among US policymakers. This culminated in the enactment of the Foreign Investment and National Security Act, 2007 that changed the way foreign direct investments are reviewed. First, it included ’critical infrastructures’ and ’homeland security’ as areas of concern comparable with ’national security’ under Exon-Florio provision. Second, it requires CFIUS to investigate all foreign investments involving foreign entities owned or controlled by a foreign government regardless of the nature of business. Therefore, it can safely be concluded that ’national security’ concerns may restrict the free flow of foreign investment into US.
An OECD study across 39 jurisdictions found that transportation is the most targeted sector all the jurisdictions have discriminatory foreign investment policy in this sector. The discrimination usually takes three forms: blanket restrictions, sector-specific licensing provisions or contracting, and trans-sectoral measures. The study however concludes that discriminatory investment rules serve as a policy of last resort if all other mechanisms fail, investment policy can be used to prevent investments by foreign entities that may pose risks.
Can it be argued that there is a legitimate national security reason to prevent FDI in Indian railways?
Railways and airways are both modes of transportation. Yet under the present Indian laws, FDI in railways is prohibited while it is allowed in ’air transport service’. In ’scheduled air transport service’ 49% FDI is allowed under automatic route and in ’non-scheduled air transport service’ 74% FDI is allowed – 49% under automatic route and beyond it through approval. Moreover, in ’helicopter services/seaplane services requiring DGCA approval’, 100% FDI is allowed under automatic route. If FDI is not prohibited for air transport on grounds of ’national security’, it is difficult to see why railways should be treated differently.
The prohibition of FDI in railways can be traced back to the Industrial Policy Resolution (IPR), 1948. Railways along with atomic energy, arms and ammunitions were reserved only for state monopolies. The position was reiterated in Schedule A of IPR 1956, which expanded the list of industries (to include air transport also) the ’future development of which would be the exclusive responsibility of the state’. The reason for including ’public utilities services’ within Schedule A was for ’planned and rapid development’ and to provide ’investment on a scale which only the State’ could provide. Evidently, national security never motivated the policy makers to include railways as a state monopoly in the first place. So, it is hard to justify the current blanket ’prohibition’ of FDI in railways on grounds of ’national security’.
Under the present regime, FDI can come in automatically (automatic route) or through Government approval (approval route). If FDI in railways is allowed under approval route, ’national security’ concerns can be looked into by Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB). If it thinks the concerns are valid, it can reject the FDI proposal. If there is no such valid concern, FDI will be allowed. Subsequent to the FIPB approval, if any genuine ’national security’ concern arises, the foreign investment itself will not be protected under bilateral investment treaties (BITs). For example, Art. 14 of the India-China BIT provides for the ’exception’ clause which excludes from the scope of the treaty any action under domestic laws for protection of ’essential security interests’ by a Contracting Party. The ICSID held in CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic (link) (in paragraph 360) that ’essential security interests’ include ’national security’. Therefore, India can take appropriate actions under domestic law (even expropriate the foreign investment) if there are valid ’national security’ concerns.
To conclude, national security is certainly a crucial issue for foreign investment into any country including India. However, apprehension in itself should not be a ground to prohibit foreign investment. The current legal regime gives enough room to India to address these concerns within the rule of law framework. Imposing a blanket prohibition on foreign investment in Indian railways because of vague national security concerns is neither necessary nor justified.
Tags: FDI, FDI in india, FDI in railways, government in India, India, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, indian polity, judiciary, law and order, National security, national security FDI, policy in india, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polity of india, polityinindia, price of electricity, public administration, railways, railways in india
The Aam Aadmi Party led Delhi Government has (link) slashed power tariffs in Delhi, and is in the midst of an ongoing tussle (link) with Reliance owned discom BSES over the supply of electricity in certain parts of Delhi. The AAP, even before taking the reins of the Delhi Government had long accused the Delhi discoms of overcharging consumers, and had demanded an audit into their activities, something they have now initiated (link).
Meanwhile, Delhi’s electricity regulator, the Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission (DERC) has raised tariffs (link), and also stated that the Delhi Government cannot “cannot interfere in fixing tariff” (link).
What is going on here? On the one hand is the claim by the AAP Government that discoms are over-charging consumers. They seek to resolve this issue by (a) asking discoms to reduce tariffs by 50 percent, and (b) asking the CAG to audit the discoms to see whether they are overcharging. Added to this mix is the DERC which states that the Delhi Government has no power to reduce tariffs. It can only subsidize consumers if it wants. There is a complex legal and regulatory framework with a complex history that needs to be understood here.
“Electricity” is an entry in List III (Concurrent List) of the Seventh Schedule of the Indian Constitution. This means that electricity can be regulated by both the states and the Central Government. How this works in practice is that purely intra-state generation, production, distribution and consumption of electricity is regulated by the state. Any inter-state aspect of this process is regulated by the Central Government. For example, if a power distribution company in Delhi buys power from a generation company that sells power to 4-5 other states, the terms of the purchase will be regulated by the Central Government.
Until about 10 years ago, electricity distribution in most states was run by state-owned companies (one may remember the infamous DESU in Delhi). Electricity distribution in many states is still run by state-owned companies, but many states have privatised this function to a large extent. More importantly, the process of fixing tariffs for electricity has changed. Why?
State governments have an obvious incentive to keep power prices low. It is a sop given to consumers who then vote for the party in government. How this was being done was broadly the following: the state government would direct the state-owned electricity distribution company to keep electricity prices artificially low. The company would consequently be charging consumers a price lower than the cost of providing them electricity. Since the company never recovered the cost of providing electricity, it basically provided poor quality of electricity. They were essentially loss-making entities, being told by the state government to keep operating as loss-making companies to subsidise consumers. The consequences were poor quality of electricity, and lack of expansion of the electricity supply to all segments of the population.
Most importantly, and conveniently for state governments, the loss from under-charging consumers was borne by the distribution company, and not the state government. State governments, rarely transferred the difference between the cost and the price being charged to the distribution company. So even though discoms became more and more financially unviable, state governments never suffered any financial consequences. They could therefore afford to get away while being fiscally irresponsible, and consumers got low quality electricity at low prices.
Parliament’s Standing Committee on Energy noted in 2002(link):
“…tariffs not related to costs of operation, the inefficient operational phases and nearly 50% of the energy consumed not metered which go towards agricultural consumption, hut lighting, T&D losses and pilferage. T&D losses reported by many SEBs are fudged figures. There is free or subsidised power supply and absence of commercial outlook. Political intervention in decision-making by SEBs is rampant. Shortage of power and energy is perennial. There was lack of clear cut policies, organisational purpose, control or responsibility and frequent change of leadership. This is coupled with overstaffing and low productivity and revenue earning distribution function totally neglected.”
The condition of discoms throughout the country became acute by the mid-1990s. This extract is from a debate in Parliament in 1998 (link):
“…we are today in a critical financial situation in the power sector…I have already explained about the poor and fast deteriorating financial health of the SEBs [State Electricity Boards]. With their finances fast getting eroded, the SEBs will find it difficult to realise any improvement in their operational performance and unless their financial condition improves, they may not be able to realise even the limited capacity addition programme that is now envisaged in the State sector during the next four to five years…In short, if the present scenario of the power sector is allowed to continue, the ability of the SEBs to provide adequate electricity in a reliable manner to the consumers will fast get eroded…”
Starting in 1998, efforts were made to create independent regulators in the electricity sector. These regulators were intended to be independent bodies that would set power prices in a technocratic manner, and be independent of political pressures. This would help discoms charge the cost-price of electricity and make the sector financially viable.
At the same time, a slow process of privatisation of electricity generation and distribution was also initiated. By 2006, the National Electricity Policy of the Central Government explicitly stated that there was a need to attract private investments into the power sector (link)
“…It is therefore essential to attract adequate investments in the power sector by providing appropriate return on investment as budgetary resources of the Central and State Governments are incapable of providing the requisite funds…”
Private investors require certainty and clarity. Unlike discoms owned by states and the Central Government, they are unable to absorb losses on an endless basis. They therefore require a proper, technical mechanism of price fixation, and require that the government will stand by the price fixed by it. This was the reason for setting up independent regulators.
In 2003, Parliament passed the Electricity Act (Act) (link). The Act set up independent regulators at the Central (The Central Electricity Regulatory Commission or CERCs) and state levels (SERCs). The Act allows the “Appropriate Commission” to determine tariff according to certain principles laid down in the Act.1 These include keeping in mind that the generation, distribution and supply of electricity is done on “commercial principles”, competition, rewarding efficiency in performance, safeguarding consumer interest, etc. It also stated that tariffs cannot be amended more than once during a year.2 Importantly, the Act states that if the State Government requires a discom to provide a direct subsidy to consumers, the state government will compensate the discom in advance.3
The CERC and SERCs are therefore established as independent bodies, and one of their major functions is to regulate the tariff of electricity. The Act also set up an Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL). APTEL hears appeals from all orders of the CERC and the SERCs, including orders that fix tariff. State governments and discoms can appeal against orders of the CERC and SERCs if they feel the order is inadequate.
There was thus a very conscious move towards creating a legal framework where electricity prices were to be set by an independent body acting in a technocratic manner. It was hoped that this would lead to private investment and competition, and create a more efficient power sector in India.
The provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003 have not been implemented in letter and spirit. Electricity tariffs are not revised and set properly, SERCs are not independent enough, and state governments have done a half-hearted job of privatizing the state-owned discoms. The Chairman, CERC told Parliament’s Standing Committee on Energy in 2012 that the state of State Electricity Boards (SEBs or discoms) is almost as bad as it was in 1998.4 The Tamil Nadu State Electricity Board was reported to be bankrupt (in 2011) (link).
The CERC Chairman told Parliament’s Standing Committee on Energy in 2012 that:
“There are State Commissions which have not rationalised tariff for seven to eight years and there, even if they had taken up any kind of rationalisation exercise, it had been more of a formality. All this has contributed to the Electricity Boards coming back to the situation which they were in 2001 and probably getting worse”5
In response to a question raised in Parliament, the Power Minister stated that the situation of state owned power companies was so bad, that,
“A scheme for Financial restructuring of Discoms has been approved recently (October, 2012) with objective to enable the State Governments and the Discoms to carve out a strategy for the financial turnaround of the distribution companies in the State power sector which will be enabled by the lenders agreeing to restructure/reschedule the existing short-term debt…”6
The answer clearly lies in a continued move towards more technocratic tariff setting, and getting state governments to cede control over state-owned discoms/privatise the electricity sector. It is in this context that we must study the conflicts over the prices of electricity in Delhi.
Delhi privatised its electricity distribution some time in 2002 (link) As per a news report, during the last 10 years, “cost of power has increased 300%, mainly because of higher coal prices and a rise in the financing charges due to higher interest rates, while the rate at which it is sold to retail consumers has increased by only 70% during the period…” (link). Whether the increase in prices is correct needs to be determined through a process of audits and reviews. However, some points need to be made:
- Electricity prices in Delhi are set by the Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission (DERC), and not by the Discoms or the State Government. The DERC follows an extremely transparent method of determining tariffs. It involves stakeholders in every stage of this tariff determination process (a recent order can be accessed here).
- The Delhi Government is legally not permitted to direct discoms or the DERC to reduce tariffs. The reduction or increase in tariffs is dependent on the process followed by the DERC under the Electricity Act, 2003.
- If the Delhi Government thinks the DERC has erred in setting the tariff, it is free to go to the APTEL and challenge DERC’s order.
- It is free to order an audit of the discoms, and then take a decision on the functioning of these discoms after the results of the audit are published.
- If the Delhi Government still thinks that the electricity prices are too high, it is free to subsidise consumers. There is however, one crucial difference between a subsidy the Delhi Government would give now, as opposed to before discoms in Delhi were privatized. Before privatization, the Delhi Government could have forced state-owned discoms to absorb the losses. Today, the burden of funding this subsidy has to be borne by the Delhi Government. According to news reports, this subsidy will force the government to cough up an additional Rs. 201 crore in the lastquarter of 2013-14… (link). This subsidy is apparently being paid for by scrapping infrastructure projects. Notably, there is no rational basis (yet) for claiming that electricity is over-priced by 50 percent. And as pointed out earlier, even after all the tariff hikes in the recent past, the cost of electricity in Delhi is far higher than what consumers pay for it.
As point 5 shows, once the government bears the burden of the subsidy, taxpayers have a very real stake in the game. We may decide that it is fine for the government to subsidise electricity. But at what cost? We are discussing not just a financial cost, but the cost of trying to bulldoze legal institutions such as the DERC into submission on the basis of a simplistic claim of corruption without any actual evidence (yet) of over-priced electricity. We are also discussing the cost of going back to a regressive era where we consumers received poor quality electricity at low prices because elected governments were playing a cynical game of charging less for less. The current fight over electricity pricing goes to the heart of what kind of institutions we build for the future.
1. Section 61
2. S. 62
3. S. 65
4. Oral evidence of Chairman, CERC to Standing Committee on Energy in its 30th Report on Functioning of Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC), August 2012.
6. Unstarred question no.1635 on Provision of electricity at economical rate, by Shri Wakchaure Bhausaheb Rajaram, answered on 07.03.2013, Lok Sabha.
Tags: aam aadmi party, AAP, arvind kejriwal, BSES, delhi electricity, Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission, Delhi Government, democracy, democracy in india, electricity, electricity distribution, electricity prices, electricity pricing, electricity rates, electricity tariff, government in India, India, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, indian polity, judiciary, law and order, policy in india, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polity of india, polityinindia, price of electricity, public administration
Some good stuff to read this week:
Vinod K. Jose in Caravan on the lack of a larger philosophical framework for the Indian media to operate within: “Habits of Mind”
Nobel Laureate physicist Walter Kohn remembers one-time partner, Indian physicist Chanchal Kumar Majumdar in “A master and his protege“.
Pratap Bhanu Mehta’s engaging piece on the election verdict in the Delhi, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh: “Left Behind”
Moiz Tundawala’s incisive piece on the rule of law in India: “ON INDIA’S POSTCOLONIAL ENGAGEMENT WITH THE RULE OF LAW”
Tags: democracy, democracy in india, government in India, India, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, indian polity, judiciary, law and order, policy in india, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polity of india, polityinindia, public administration
In October this year, an additional sessions judge in Delhi pronounced a controversial judgment in a rape case involving sexual intercourse between a man and a woman after they informally performed certain marriage-related ceremonies without getting legally married. This post reflects upon the judgment and highlights certain ironies that flow out from the ideology behind this judgment as well as the Indian law that allows marital rape.
In this case, the accused man had applied vermillion over the 24-year-old woman’s forehead and declared themselves as married, after which she consented to sexual intercourse with him. They also went to Jammu for court marriage but the marriage had not been solemnized yet. The judge held that she was a mature woman who should have known that mere performance of certain ceremonies does not suffice to constitute a valid marriage. He also expressed his disturbance at the trend of complaint of rape on false assurance of marriage by girls who consensually engage in sexual intercourse after the performance of some marriage-related ceremonies. The judge remarked that these are mature women who voluntarily elope with their lovers for bodily pleasure and fabricate the story of kidnap and rape to escape harsh treatment from their parents. It is difficult to believe that such women, even if they may belong to rural areas, do not understand what constitutes a valid marriage and are misled by performance of some rites and ceremonies by men. Such complaints trivialize the offence of rape. He also remarked that “girls are morally and socially bound not to indulge in sexual intercourse before a proper marriage and if they do so, it would be to their peril and they cannot be heard to cry later on that it was rape.”
While many have criticized this judgment, comments posted below the online news report show that the judgment has also been hailed as correct by many people.
Both the Indian Supreme Court (see Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, 20 May 2013) and the Delhi High Court (see Abhishek Jain v. State,7 June 2013) have held that sexual intercourse on false promise of marriage amounts to rape. This case involves not merely a promise to marry, but overt acts clearly indicating the intention of the man to marry the woman. It of course needs to be established that the woman’s consent was obtained on the false promise of marriage and there were no subsequent events as a result of which the marriage did not take place, although the intention to marry was present. The judge and the comments that accuse the woman of misusing the law need to worry about the meaning of free consent. This is not a case where a woman forced a man to marry her after she realized the moral consequences of having sexual intercourse without marriage, and then filed a complaint of rape when he refused marriage. If this was such a case, then why did the man perform the drama of putting vermillion and going to court for court marriage? After declaring them as married, why did he later refuse to accept the woman as his wife? Even though performance of some ceremonies does not constitute a legal marriage, such conduct does indicate expression of intention to marry. And if this promise of marriage was falsely made with the sole intention of having sexual intercourse, the conduct does amount to rape as per Indian law.
This judgment reflects the attitude of a society that blames women for rape, even where the man knowingly commits fraud. The judgment also reflects the tendency to understand rape only as ‘stranger rape’, where an unknown man forcefully assaults a woman who tried to physically resist him but was overcome. A number of reports indicate that most rapes are committed by known men. There is a need to understand the notions of passive submission and wrongfully obtained (even if not physically forcefully obtained) consent.
There are two further ironies that flow from this judgment.
First, the judgment recognises the agency of women where it was missing, but undermines agency where it should have been recognized. Recent developments in feminism have asked for the recognition of agency or autonomy of women and have argued against treating women as passive victims of male domination. In this judgment, by claiming that the woman is mature enough to understand the meaning of marriage the judge recognises the agency of a woman and refrains from treating her as a helpless victim of male domination. At the same time, the judgment preaches women not to have sex before marriage, thus denying them sexual autonomy. Thus, the judgment seems to be giving agency to women for the purpose of depriving a legally available benefit, but not actually providing liberty or any benefit. This is not how the agency discourse should work—viewing agency where there was probably none or very limited, and denying it where it is required to enhance individual liberty.
Second, the judgment, coupled with the Indian law that continues to condone marital rape, leaves women in an awkward position legally. In this case, the woman filed a rape complaint after the man refused to recognize her as his wife. Thus, where sexual intercourse takes place after performance of some informal ceremonies, the judge put the blame on the woman, holding her responsible for her actions, stating that she should know what a valid marriage is, and admonishing her for making false allegations of rape against the man. However, in case a woman is able to prove that the man did in fact marry her by performing these ceremonies, the man then becomes legally absolved from all allegations of rape, since marital rape is not considered a crime. This makes the promise or actual performance of marriage irrelevant, leaving the woman in both cases without any remedy.
In times where we are trying to establish the law on conduct such as sexual harassment and provide legal space to nuanced concepts like ‘a hostile work environment’, it is deplorable that we haven’t even got the basics of a patently grave crime like rape right.
Tags: democracy, democracy in india, government in India, India, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, indian polity, judiciary, law and order, marital rape, marriage rape, policy in india, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polity of india, polityinindia, public administration, rape, valid marriage
Tags: Bill, budget, CBO, democracy, democracy in india, fiscal deficit, government in India, India, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, Indian politics, indian polity, judiciary, law and order, Member of Parliament, Parliamentary Budget Officer, PBO, policy in india, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polity of india, polityinindia, public administration
A woman bank manager was brutally attacked yesterday while inside an ATM in Bangalore yesterday. Apart from the gruesome attack on the lady, what has been bizarrely shocking has been the response of the police to the same.
Facts: On Nov. 20, a woman, who is also a bank manager (not clear if she was the manager of the same bank as the ATM), was attacked brutally by a gun-wielding attacker, who hit her on the head with a machete after she resisted his demand to withdraw cash and hand it to him. The lady, Jyothi Uday, was attacked at 7.10 a.m., and lay unconscious for three hours until 2 schoolchildren saw her and raised an alarm. The right side of her body has reportedly been paralyzed due to the attack. Incidentally, the ATM is located in the LIC divisional office building, 50 metres away from a police station. (Read more here and here)
While the police have launched an extensive manhunt for the assailant (the entire incident has been recorded on CCTV), in a bizarre development, the Home Minister for Karnataka, has also done the following:
1. The Karnataka Government has set a 3-day deadline within which all banks have to provide security guards at all ATM kiosks.
2. ATMs that do not have this security may be locked up/shut down.
The specific statement is: “We are aware that Banks are governed by RBI guidelines. But law and order is a state subject and so we have powers to act against them to ensure Tuesday’s incidents do not recur…”
(This report was published here.)
So, if I may re-frame the argument for the Karnataka government, it is essentially saying:
Law and order is a state subject. That is, the state government has the responsibility to ensure law and order for its citizens. This is usually done by ensuring a well functioning police force, which is alert, and has a good response time. In this case, we do not have either. The lady was lying inside an ATM for 3 hours. The shutter of the ATM was down, when it is usually open. And we had to be alerted by schoolchildren. To get over our inability to provide security, we will force banks to hire security guards. We do not care if this increases the cost of running ATMs substantially. We also do not care if many ATMs have to be shut down, depriving people of access to an easy source of quick, and cheap cash dispensers. We may do a really really bad job of ensuring public safety, but by forcing banks to hire security guards, we can easily solve this problem. Not only do we not have to solve the problem to having to think hard and figure out ways to ensure a better police force, we also do not have to worry about boring stuff like financial inclusion, etc. Tomorrow if pedestrians are killed in road accidents, we will similarly ban people from crossing the road, and force them all to buy cars. So what if many people can then not walk on the road.
All hail our fewi-quik governance.
Tags: atm attack, bangalore atm attack, bangalore police, crime in bangalore, crime in karnataka, democracy, democracy in india, government in India, India, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, Indian politics, indian polity, indian public administration, iPal, judiciary, karnataka police, law and order, law and order bangalore, law and order karnataka, police state in india, policy in india, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polity of india, polityinindia, public administration
iPal is an attempt to make comprehensible certain words that sound familiar, but mean something entirely different when used in Indian governance and politics.
1. Aam Aadmi: Rich people who dress badly.
2. Public interest: a) Interest of Aam aadmi.
b) source of power to override law, constitution, logic, reason, everything.
3. Subsidy: Screw you poor aadmi. Yours sincerely, Aam aadmi.
4. Taxpayer money: Kalpavriksha (mythological, wish-fulfilling divine tree said to fulfill all desires). Also, free lunch.
5. Neo-liberals: Jerks who inconvenience us with facts.
6. Public goods: Stuff the government wants to do with your money. Includes running hotels, making bread etc.
7. Free market fundamentalist: Anyone who wants the government to get out of the business of running hotels or making bread.
8. Pro-Poor: Anti-growth
9. Pro-growth: Crony capitalism
10. Rule of law: Nobody’s business.
11. Sustainable growth: slow growth
12. Due-Process: See, “The Trial” by Kafka.
13. Economic justice/Inclusion: Socialism.
14. Freedom: It’s nice, till you exercise it.
15. Right to free speech: Right to say nice things.
16. Judiciary: Legislation without representation.
17. PIL: Your interest, my litigation.
18. Justice: Often delivered without reference to law.
19. Clearance: Roadblock with a welcome sign.
20. Parliament: World’s most efficient law-making body. Has passed 8 bills in 17 minutes.
21. IAS: Individuals anointed as saviours.
22. Competent authority: ?? (See definition of ‘due process’)
23. Evidence-based policymaking: “My 20 years of experience says…”
24. Lal Bahadur Shastri Academy for IAS probationers: Hogwarts.
*By Anirudh Burman and Suyash Rai.
Tags: democracy, democracy in india, government in India, India, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, Indian politics, indian polity, indian public administration, iPal, judiciary, policy in india, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polity of india, polityinindia, public administration, Public interest
The text below is from my brief titled “Who is a Public Authority under the Right to Information Act, 2005?” as published on the website of Accountability Initiative, published in September 2013. The brief can be accessed here.
The definition of ‘public authorities’ under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (“RTI Act”) has been an extremely contentious issue since the RTI came into force. However, in the wake of an order of the Central Information Commission (“CIC”) declaring political parties as public authorities under the RTI Act1, the issue has taken centre stage in public debates. The Central Government sought to undo the CIC decision by proposing to amend the definition of Public Authorities to exclude political parties. This amendment has now been referred to a Parliamentary standing committee. This development affords an important opportunity to examine the definition of public authorities, and controversies arising from its interpretation. The specific focus of this brief is on a sample of cases that were brought to the High Courts.
The RTI Act empowers citizens with the right to access information under the control of ‘public authorities’. Accordingly, RTI Act creates a legal framework to make good this right by defining public authorities, allowing citizens to ask public authorities for information, and imposing penalties on officials of public authorities for failing to disclose ‘information’ defined in Section 2(f). The RTI Act also mandates that “every public authority shall pro-actively disclose information pertaining to it, and maintain its documents and records to facilitate the right to information under the Act”.
Therefore the question of “who is a public authority?” is critical one because it sets the boundaries of the scope of the RTI Act specifically and the transparency regime in the country, more generally. In the last seven years, a wide variety of entities otherwise considered to be private entities (such as schools, colleges and sports associations) have been declared public authorities, and have had to comply with the requirements of the RTI Act. A perusal of judgments of High Courts and the CIC reveals a diverse and at times, conflicting jurisprudence regarding the ambit of ‘public authorities’ under the RTI Act.
To read more, click here.
Tags: accountability initiative, democracy, democracy in india, government in India, India, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, Indian politics, indian polity, judiciary, policy in india, political parties RTI, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polity of india, polityinindia, Right to information, right to information act, RTI, RTI Act, should political parties be under RTI
This post was first published on http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/legalprofession/, on September 23, 2013.
As skepticism mounts over India’s economic resilience and economists rush to blame India’s policy framework for the woes of her economy, the role that India’s BigLaw plays in her law and policy making processes assumes greater significance now more than ever before. In the backdrop of an unpredictable, evolving and complex regulatory and legal regime, the quintessential Indian law firm is expected to not only play the flawless draftsman or the aggressive negotiator but also an organization capable of dealing with the regime, its regulators and policymakers. Indian corporate law firms have responded to this demand by claiming policy affairs as a niche area of their legal practice. In this backdrop, this post explores how and why the Indian corporate lawyer has transitioned from a boardroom negotiator and a draftsman to an active participant in India’s law and policy making processes, and highlights potential conflicts associated with this transition.
Today, India’s law and policymaking processes do not only involve the political class, bureaucrats, civil society actors or jurisprudential developments. A proposed policy or law (in particular, one that affects commerce in India) is regularly preceded by well-publicized detailed analyses proactively offered by leading corporate lawyers in the country. As members of expert committees constituted by the government and regulators, providers of feedback on government-released discussion papers, columnists or interviewees in the media, members of business associations interfacing with the government, Indian corporate law firms strive to make conspicuous contribution to proposed laws and policies. The fact that several prominent Indian corporate law firms now project themselves as having an established regulatory and policy practice (which typically includes reform initiatives, legislative drafting work and holding policy-oriented consultations with government actors), underscores their desire to be seen as being active in the policymaking space. A couple of large corporate Indian law firms are now reported to have dedicated, though limited, resources with profiles involving government affairs and policy formulation. These trends are indicative of a progressive tendency to pro-actively contribute towards law and policy making in India.
The growing participation of the corporate legal community in policy and legislative work is directly attributable to an inclusive approach being increasingly adopted by Indian legislators, policy makers and regulators in recent times. Take, for instance, the FDI policymaking space, a most coveted and crowded practice area dominated by India’s BigLaw. In sharp contrast to the pre-2010 era when FDI policymaking processes had no space for involvement of legal professionals, in 2010, the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (being the FDI policymaker in India) initiated a discussion paper series inviting comments on proposed FDI policies from all stakeholders [i]. In addition to responses from industry associations, these discussion papers have, in fact, garnered policy-oriented responses from law firms having an established practice in this space [ii]. Similarly, drafts of proposed rules and regulations released by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs and the Securities and Exchange Board of India (the Indian securities regulator) regularly elicits detailed analyses by corporate law firms known for their capital markets practice [iii].
In addition to the policy and regulatory framework, the contribution that Indian corporate law firms have been making to substantive lawmaking cannot be understated. Several substantive corporate laws (such as the Competition Act, 2002, the Companies Act, 2013, etc.) brought into effect in the last decade have been preceded by consultations with law firms known for their expertise in areas governed by such legislations. So much so, the drafting of certain provisions and filings under these legislations was reportedly entrusted to leading legal professionals in the corporate field. Similarly, leading corporate lawyers were engaged as consultants by the government-appointed commission entrusted with the responsibility of overhauling the legal framework applicable to the Indian financial services sector [iv].
Participation of the Indian corporate legal community extends to the implementation and enforcement stages of policies and regulations as well. Owing to the lack of institutional mechanisms that facilitate formal stakeholder participation at the implementation stages, most often, such participation occurs where a law firm identifies an ambiguity or an unaddressed situation in an implemented law or regulation in the course of assisting a client in a transaction, and approaches the regulator or policymaker for clarifications. In the past, queries seeking transaction-specific clarifications have resulted in the regulator or policymaker addressing the problem for the benefit of the general class of stakeholders. A perfect example of this situation are clarifications obtained through the Informal Guidance Scheme implemented by the Indian securities regulator, which is akin to the Interpretive Guidance initiative of the SEC.
In addition to direct contributions of the kind described above, corporate lawyers have made remarkable contributions to the Indian policy framework indirectly through participation in business associations such as the Confederation of Indian Industries, chambers of commerce, etc. Previous evaluations of government-stakeholder consultations in India have indicated that the interests of members of such associations are not always aligned [v]. Conflicting interests amongst members often restrict the ability of business associations to convey their views on proposed and implemented policies to policymakers. Corporate law firms, through their participation in such associations, are able to impart objectivity and clarity to the associations’ collective views on laws and policies that affect the industry. Through presentations made to such associations, participation in specialized committees and consultation processes initiated by the government and regulators with such business associations, corporate lawyers often end up contributing to the policy framework by participating in actual stakeholder and industry-level discussions. For instance, the post-budget announcement days regularly witness tax law firms explaining the implications of the budget on various industries. These views often supply the foundation for opinion-formation by industry-specific business associations on the budget.
Participation by BigLaw in policymaking is mutually beneficial to policymakers, regulators and the participating law firms. While the former are benefitted with the expertise and real-world experience that law firms bring to the table, a capacity to deal with and establish smooth interface with regulators and policymakers can potentially earn a premium for law firms from a client’s perspective. However, the increasing role of corporate law firms in policy formulation and implementation often raises several questions regarding the objectivity underlying their contribution. To what extent are a law firm’s views insulated from client requirements? Do law firms contribute toward policymaking only when warranted by specific transactions? How does one address the inherent conflict of interest while analyzing policy-oriented feedback offered by legal professionals in the corporate field? These questions often reduce the receptivity of lawyers’ views at policy-level discussions. As unregulated as this space currently is, these questions are open-ended and it remains to be seen whether the benefits of professional expertise and legal skills outweigh concerns of objectivity.
Be that as it may, with increasing inclusiveness in the Indian law and policy making space, credit for contributing towards law and policy making in India can no longer be restricted to socially activist lawyers, legal jurists and civil society actors. By volunteering in his own way towards improvisation of proposed and implemented policies, laws and regulations, India’s contemporary corporate lawyer is now making a leap from being a plain dealmaker to a contributor to the law, policy and rule making processes of the country.
Bhargavi Zaveri is a Mumbai-based solicitor with experience in M&A, private equity and corporate practice in India. She is presently an affiliated fellow with the HLS Program on the Legal Profession where she is researching FDI law and policymaking, and the interface between legal professionals and policymakers in India.
Tags: Biglaw, democracy, democracy in india, Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission, FSLRC, government in India, India, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, Indian politics, indian polity, judiciary, law firms in india, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polity of india, polityinindia
A fast track sessions court in Delhi awarded the death penalty to the four adult rapists in the December 16 gang-rape case where a young woman was raped and brutalized by six men. One of the culprits was a juvenile who was sentenced to three years in a remand home (the highest punishment under the Juvenile Justice Act) and the fifth died in custody. Ironically, according to a newspaper report, of the 23 rape cases Additional Sessions Judge Yogesh Khanna (the presiding judge) heard this year, 20 of them resulted in acquittal, primarily because the evidence against them was not strong.
In another recent incident, a photo-journalist was gang-raped at the Shakti Mills compound in Mumbai giving a blow to its reputation as one of the safest cities in India for women. It has now come to light that these men were repeat offenders having raped around 10 women including a rag picker and a sex-worker in the last six months.
And this brings us to the core of the problem – the impunity with which the men feel they can get away with sexual crimes in India. A toxic mix of patriarchal and regressive values about women’s honour and purity, inert judiciary and an unresponsive and ill-trained police force combines to ensure that women rarely report sexual crimes. If they do report, they are often subjected to further trauma by the police force who may refuse to file FIRs, blame the victim, and make her undergo degrading medical tests. While collection of forensic evidence is crucial for investigating a rape, the police are hardly trained in new and scientific investigating techniques nor are there sufficient laboratories to process forensic evidence in a timely manner (see here and here). The judiciary is also no less to blame for causing trauma to a rape survivor – whether through delays or allowing the moral character of the woman to be called into question.
In India, women are subjected to milder forms of street sexual harassment such as groping, stalking, flashing, passing lewd remarks almost on a daily basis. In fact, such harassment is so rampant in public places that it is taken as normal. Often women themselves are blamed for such actions. Therefore, few women even bother to complain and treat it as something that is upto them to avoid.
The public outrage triggered by the brutal rape of December 16 in Delhi finally broke the silence and apathy surrounding these issues. It also forced the government to set up a committee under the chairmanship of Justice J.S. Verma to recommend changes to the rape laws. It made wide-ranging recommendations on laws related to rape, sexual harassment, trafficking, child sexual abuse, medical examination of victims, police, electoral and educational reforms. Based on some of these recommendations, the government promulgated the Criminal Laws (Amendment) Ordinance amending the Indian Penal Code. The Ordinance became an Act of Parliament when it was passed in the Budget Session of 2013.
However, a lot of the public debate is focussed on the type of punishment that should be meted out to rapists – castration, death penalty or life-imprisonment. High penalty may be a deterrent only if there is certainty of prosecution, which is sorely lacking given the condition of the police and judiciary. The data from the National Crime Records Bureau show that while registration of cases has been rising, the conviction rate remains at a low 13%-14%. The high number of pending cases is also a cause for concern.
Table 1 provides a snapshot of the penalty levied for certain sexual crimes against women and the number of cases registered each year since 2008. It may be noted that the new Criminal Laws (Amendment) Act, 2013 which amended the Indian Penal Code among other Acts have added new offences such as acid attack and stalking and changed the quantum of punishment in existing offences. The data for these offences would be available from next year.
Table 1: Penalty for sexual crimes and number of cases registered
|Rape (Sec 376 IPC)||7 years to life (lower for marital rape)||21,397||22,172||24,206||24,923|
|Molestation (Sec 354 IPC)||Upto 2 years & fine||38,711||40,613||42,968||45,351|
|Sexual harassment (Sec 509 IPC)||Upto 1 year & fine||11,009||9,961||8,570||9,173|
|Indecent Prohibition of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986||Upto 2 years & fine of Rs 2000 (increases on second offence)||845||895||453||141|
|Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956||Varies between 3 months to 14 years||2,474||2,499||2,435||2,563|
|Sources: Indian Penal Code; Indecent Representation of Women Act,1986; Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956; “Crime in India -2012,” National Crime Records Bureau.|
Table 2 provides the data for the cases of crimes against women that were tried, convicted and acquitted since 2009. Crimes against women include rape, kidnapping & abduction of women and girls, dowry deaths, molestation, sexual harassment, cruelty by husband and relatives, importation of girls, Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, Indecent Representation of Women Act, 1986, and Sati Act,1987.
Table 2: Cases of crimes against women that were tried, convicted, acquitted and pending
Status of Cases
|Year||Registered||Trials completed||Conviction||Acquittal||% of convictions|
|Sources: “Crime in India – 2012”; National Crime Records Bureau.|
As the data shows, there has certainly been an increase in registration of rape cases. On the one hand this is a cause for concern, on the other it may be a sign that more people are coming forward to register rape cases. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude whether the number of incidents of rape has gone up or the registration of cases has improved. However, the high pendency in courts and the low rate of conviction point to the dire need for police and judicial reforms. Various commissions such as the National Police Commission, the Law Commission, the Gore Committee, the Ribeiro Committee, the Padmanabhaiah Committee and the Malimath Committee have made extensive suggestions to reform the police. However, hardly any far-reaching reforms have been undertaken to overhaul the law enforcement machinery in the country.
In order to ensure that women not only feel safe to venture unaccompanied in public places but also report crimes, the government, judiciary and civil society need to change their approaches drastically. The government needs to muster the political will to ensure an independent, well-trained and well-equipped police force. It also needs to legislate judiciously and ensure that the laws are implemented. The judiciary needs to tackle pendency, fine-tune the process of selection of judges and ensure that there is better quality of judicial infrastructure and manpower. Last but not the least, civil society is crucial for not only pressurizing the government to act but also to initiate far-reaching changes in the way women are treated in the country.
Tags: acid attack, Capital punishment, Criminal law, December 16, Delhi, democracy, democracy in india, gang rape case, gang-rape, government, government in India, India, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, Indian penal Code, Indian politics, indian polity, judiciary, juvenile justice act, National Crime Records Bureau, pendency, police reform, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polity of india, polityinindia, rape, sexual harassment, training, violence
This post was first published on http://logos.nationalinterest.in on September 15, 2013, and can be accessed here.
A minimalist theory of state functions explains the main functions of the state as being (a) the function of collecting revenue, (b) the maintenance of law and order, and (c) the protection of a nation’s boundaries. State capacity is a pre-requisite to perform even these essential functions. The roles of states in contemporary times is not limited to these minimal functions. Most states perform these, as well as other roles, sometimes as facilitators, regulators, or direct market participants. In India, there is a broad existing consensus in favour of the state acting in all these capacities. Indeed, there is no clear consensus yet, on whether the state needs to withdraw from certain functions, towards a more liberal construct of the role of a state.
In this context, it is essential to connect the legitimacy of the state, to its capacity to deliver. As a social-welfare democracy, our constitutional goals mandate that the state perform roles that very few developed democracies were tasked with at their inception (the eradication of mass poverty, illiteracy and starvation). Therefore, the legitimacy of our state apparatus has never been measured merely against how well it provides the three minimal services of collecting revenue, maintaining law and order, and protecting our borders. These diverse and competing expectations from a fledgeling state apparatus may in fact have compromised its ability to deliver the essential three services in the first place. In short, because we asked our young state to do too much too soon, it may not have been able to deliver basic services expected of every state.
Therefore, if the state is to attain legitimacy, it has to perform its functions more efficiently. And since there is an existing consensus on asking it to do a multitude of things, there has to be a comprehensive analysis of the capacity of the state to deliver. In some instances, such as when police-population and judge-population ratios are measured, it is easy to estimate our current numbers, compare it with states who deliver law and order, and justice more efficiently, and estimate how well our current police-population ratio and judge-population ratios measure up against these countries. The police and the judiciary are however relatively homogenous departments that perform a limited number of tasks i.e. the police exists to prevent crimes from occurring, and investigating crimes which have already occurred, and judges exist to interpret the law, examine the facts and deliver justice.
But what about the state departments of health? They oversee and regulate private hospitals. They also own and supervise government hospitals. They have to ensure the genuineness of medicines, the operation of emergency health services. They also have to implement food safety laws and standards. If the central government starts the National Rural Health Mission, they also have to implement the mission. In many cases, the same individuals comprising part of the bureaucracy may be performing these multiple tasks which require very different skills and much more manpower. If this is indeed true (and many commentators feel it is) then contrary to the pop-policy debate on reducing the role of the state, there is an argument for substantial investment in state capacity. In other words, most bureaucracies perform multiple, and heterogenous tasks. However, their internal design, and capacity has not evolved to take on the burden of the ever-expanding regulatory state.
One alternative would be to insist on a drastic overhaul of the bureaucracy, as many do. Another would be to insist, or formalize mechanisms for ensuring that any addition to the tasks of a state agency is complemented by an increase in state capacity. The law, rule or regulation that delegates a particular administrative function on a particular agency should do so only if it can justify that the agency is best placed (in terms of skills and resources) to perform this additional task. The latter may in the long run create a virtuous cycle leading to an internalization of the principle of manpower costs before new laws and rules are created.
Tags: democracy, democracy in india, government, government in India, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, Indian politics, indian polity, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polity of india, polityinindia, public administration, state capacity, state efficiency
This post was first published in The Broad Mind, on September 12, 2013.
Both houses of Parliament recently passed The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (“2013 Act”), repealing the century-old Land Acquisition Act, 1894. For years, the new law was touted as the panacea to the evils the old Act perpetuated, not least, the broad discretionary powers to state authorities for acquiring land for a “public purpose”. News reports have pointed to how land is allegedly bought at below market prices (read here and here), and consequently sparks loud protests.
The new Act seeks to resolve this controversy by providing for higher compensation (up to four times the market value in rural areas), requiring prior consent for land acquisition (80 percent of affected families for land acquired on behalf of private companies and 70 percent for public private partnership projects), providing detailed time lines for each stage of the acquisition process (estimated to take approximately 4 years!), rehabilitation and resettlement of affected families in certain cases, etc. This however does not address the main cause of the controversy: state intervention in land acquisition on behalf of private entities.
The old 1894 Act created an expansive definition of “public purpose” based on the assumption that the state would be the chief architect of industrial development, for which it needed to have the power to acquire land for a multitude of purposes. This included some arguably legitimate purposes such as the provision for town planning, development of land from public funds, and “for carrying out any educational, housing, health or slum clearance scheme sponsored by Government or by any authority established by Government. But it also included other purposes such as (a) on behalf of PSUs, and most importantly, (b) “the provision of land for any other scheme of development sponsored by Government or, with the prior approval of the appropriate Government, by a local authority”.
Many protests (including those mentioned in the news reports linked above) arose primarily because of the heavy-handedness of the state in acquiring land, sometimes on behalf of private companies, at below market prices. The new Act intends to correct this heavy-handedness. It does not however question the basic assumption of the role of the state as an interventionist intermediary in land acquisition. Instead, it tries to improve the existing condition by creating more state agencies and broadening consensus-making processes. It requires a social impact assessment through consultation with local municipalities, gram sabhas and panchayats. It creates an expert group consisting of social scientists, representatives of gram sabhas, panchayats or municipalities, technical experts and experts on rehabilitation to evaluate social impact assessment. It also creates a committee for rehabilitation and resettlement, and land acquisition and relief and rehabilitation and resettlement authorities at the state and central levels.
Whether these institutions will work efficiently is hard to predict, but their establishment is an irrevocable step down the path of establishing the state as an intermediary in all land acquisitions for a public purpose. This brings us to the root of the problem: the definition of “public purpose” in the 2013 Act. The definition of public purpose in the 2013 Act has become, if anything, more expansive and explicit. It covers acquisition for strategic purposes, infrastructure purposes (which includes everything from agro-processing units established by government entities to projects for industrial corridors), and retains most of the clauses from the 1894 Act. Worse, this definition is not exhaustive!
The philosophy behind this 2013 Act is therefore seemingly this: the existing role of the state in land acquisitions is non-negotiable. However, multiple controversies have arisen where compensation paid has allegedly been below market prices, or insufficient (This is due to the fault of state agencies since they assess market prices and give compensation.) To correct this wrong, we need to do two things: (1) create more detailed legal process to ensure clear parameters for fixing compensation, and (2) create monitoring and oversight mechanisms.
The question is this: when did the role of the state become non-negotiable? Consider the original Land Acquisition Bill introduced by the UPA in 2007. The Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 2007 (“2007 Bill”), was passed by the Lok Sabha in 2009, but lapsed when the Lok Sabha dissolved prior to the elections. The 2007 Bill contained a narrow, restrictive definition of “public purpose” based on a different premise of the role of the state in land acquisition. The definition is a complete contrast to the page-long definitions in the 1894 Act and the 2013 Act. It includes:
- acquisition for strategic purposes,
- infrastructure projects of the government where benefits accrue to the public, and
- any other purpose where land has already been purchased to the extent of 70%.
The 2007 Bill, which nearly became law, would therefore have been a complete change to this assumption of state intervention that the 2013 Act is predicated on. Between 2009 and 2013, the philosophy of reform which first motivated proposed changes to land acquisition law were completely replaced by a philosophy of incremental change. In this context, our final legislative product, the 2013 Act that replaces a century-old, much-maligned law, is a comparatively small step to prevent market abuses. It does nothing to address the cause of market failure: the role of the state.
Anirudh Burman is a Takshashila Scholar, a law graduate from Harvard, and consults with the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy and the Center for Policy Research.
Tags: democracy, democracy in india, government, government in India, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, Indian politics, indian polity, land acquisition, land acquisition act, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polity of india, polityinindia, public purpose
According to recent news reports the Indian Olympic Commission will continue to be disbarred from the International Olympic Association, due to its refusal to accept a “contentious” clause that prevents “charge-sheeted officials from taking part in administration or contesting elections.” (read here, and here) The reason is not difficult to fathom: “Its secretary-general Lalit Bhanot faces corruption charges in a 2010 Commonwealth Games-related case. India was banned in December 2012 after Mr Bhanot was elected.”
The reason the IOA refuses to accept this clause is apparently because the IOA has to comply with the law of the land:
“We can’t go beyond the law of our land. We will make our constitution according to the law of the land. We have clearly told the two-member IOC delegation that we can’t go beyond the law of the land.” (Sourced from here)
Some questions need to be asked:
a. Does incorporating this clause of the IOC violate Indian laws?
b. What prevents the IOA from incorporating standards HIGHER than what Indian laws provide?
c. Is there any special restriction placed on the IOA by the Indian government which prevents it from incorporating such a provision in its rules and regulations?
A short answer to all these questions is as follows: No, Nothing, and No.
According to the Constitution of the IOA, it is a private society registered under the Societies Registration Act XXI of 1860. Here are two clauses relevant to the current debate:
“3. To enforce all rules and regulations of the International Olympic Committee and the Indian Olympic Association and not to indulge in or associate with any activity which is in contradiction with the Olympic Charter.
To follow, observe and uphold the primacy and domination of the Olympic Charter in case of any contradiction between it and the rules, bye-laws and the constitution framed by the Indian Olympic Association.”
The Rules and Regulations of the IOA also list its voting members. There are no government members or nominees with voting rights. There is therefore no governmental pressure on it to resist the changes the IOC is asking it to make. According to its own rules, one of the functions of the General Assembly of the IOA is to enforce the rules and regulations of the IOC.
The IOA is therefore a private, i.e. non-governmental organisation that is not subject to governmental supervision, beyond the state’s supervisory powers to regulate sports associations in India. It is free agree to or sign any clause/contract/agreement that is not prohibited by law. In fact, as Clause 3 above states, one of the objects of the IOA is to enforce ALL rules and regulations of the IOC, and to not indulge in any activity which contradicts the Olympic Charter. It is then, quite clearly violating its own objects and its rules by not agreeing to the IOC’s new clause requiring charge-sheeted people be barred from the administration of the IOA.
Furthermore, the defense of acting in compliance with Indian laws can at best be described as disingenuous. The IOA as a private entity is merely an authorised agent of the IOC, who has recognized the IOA as its exclusive agent within India. The clause requiring that charge-sheeted people not be part of the IOA is a contractual term which the IOA has to agree to, in order to continue to be IOC’s recognized agent in India. No law, rule, regulation, authority, apart from the self-interest of some of its members in India prevents the IOA from agreeing to the IOC condition.
The question of course is, what is the cost of this self-interest? According to one news report, this is what Abhinav Bindra had to say about the issue:
“It is humiliating for us. When we are travelling abroad to take part in a tournament and representing the country and people ask what sort of system do you have back in India. It is a joke.” (Sourced from here)
What is the appropriate public policy response? There are some who would advocate state control over such sports associations. That however has not always yielded great results. Should this issue be left to the IOA, its constituents and sports persons under the IOA banner, with the hope that once things get even worse, someone within will step up and clean the mess? There are no quick-fix answers, and maybe the shame and embarrassment of not being able to participate in the next Olympics, and collective pain of all the athletes who are unable to participate will create a virtuous push for reform. The best, short-term fix would of course be for our police and judiciary to wake up and once and for all either convict or acquit the charge-sheeted.
Tags: 2010 commonwealth games, democracy, democracy in india, government, government in India, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, indian olympic association, Indian politics, indian polity, international olympic committee, lalit bhanot, olympic charter, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polity of india, polityinindia, Sports, sports federations in india, suresh kalmadi
This post is a reaction to media reports and analyses that look at the population size of various minority groups and anticipate how it may affect the political outcome in elections. In India, the Modi-Gandhi face-off has led media to calculate Hindu-Muslim ratios in various states and accordingly predict the result of the upcoming elections in 2014. With respect to UK, it was recently reported that ethnic minorities, especially Indians, can significantly affect election results. The need to reach out to the growing population of Asian-American voters was similarly felt in the US. These reports highlight the need for politicians to connect with the minorities to woo voters from minority groups.
My difficulty with such analyses is that they sometimes tend to treat minorities as a homogenous class and are disrespectful of their autonomy. They treat minority groups as a uniform group of voters whose interest lies only in specific issues that interest them, like racial equality or secularism. There seems to be an underlying presumption that other political issues like the economy or foreign policy or healthcare or corruption are not of much concern to them. If minority groups form a sizeable part of the voting population, it is in fact ironic that these other issues will not attract them. Equality is offered as the candy that will lure all minorities. Such reporting may also somewhere sub-consciously affect actual voting, by presenting members of minority groups as part of a broader alliance who must vote for a particular party in order to prove themselves to be loyal members of their group.
In different ways, these reports also tend to both recognize and undermine the autonomy of the majority group. On one hand, they seem to recognize that majority voters are likely to evaluate different issues, policy choices and political promises offered to them, and vote accordingly. Unlike the homogenous minority group, a majority voter might be rich, poor, capitalist, socialist, conservative, and so on. Whether the political party’s orientation is in line with the voter’s ideology and demands is what is likely to determine the outcome in case of the majority voter. However, on the other hand, such reports may present the majority as a group unaffected by the issue of equality. It is assumed that political concerns of the minorities are of no concern to the majority.
Such analyses do tend to direct the attention of political parties and people to important and legitimate concerns of minority groups, especially regarding equality. But equality as an issue should not be treated as an exclusive concern of the minorities in a nation. Further, what about groups that form an insubstantial minority in a country so as to not have sufficient voting power? Should equality for these actual ‘minorities’ be of no concern to the nation? For example, Indian politics seems to be dominated by the majority (Hindus), and the majority within the minorities (Muslims), without much space available to persons following other religions like Christians, Parsis, Sikhs (often clubbed with the Hindus, along with Jains and Buddhists) or Jews.
There is a need to shift focus from identity to issue. Identities may help reveal issues. But addressing issues should be the end, not alluring identities. It can be said that this is how politics works. But at least the media and analysts can try not to present this as legitimate and unproblematic. If offering baits to different groups works in reality, then instead of encouraging this trend and presenting it as a legitimate way of running the polity, we should seek and highlight better ways to make our democracy function.
Tags: 2014 elections, democracy, democracy in india, government, government in India, identity politics, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, Indian politics, indian polity, minorities, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polity of india, polityinindia
This is a guest post by Jeet H. Shroff. Jeet has completed his Masters’ in law from Harvard Law.
The recent decision of the Supreme Court striking down, by a majority of 2:1, the common medical entrance examination conducted by the Medical Council of India (MCI) raises important questions on the now-obvious contradiction between the Court’s stated pro-merit, pro-poor pitch and its steadily growing record for handing down pro-rich, status quoist decisions on critical issues. For long, legal observers in India and around the world have feted the visibly activist tilt of India’s highest court. Whether in matters of environmental law, socio-economic rights or political reforms, Supreme Court decisions have usually preceded and often catalyzed changes in legislative policies. Yet, a growing line of decisions in the past decade or so, have bolstered claims by those who see the Supreme Court as being activist only in speech while being status quoist in practice. Its most recent decision, striking down the single-window National Eligibility Entrance Test (NEET), which would have provided relief to millions of poor and meritorious medical students across the country, calls into serious question its progressive reputation.
The MCI-administered NEET was intended to provide medical students across the country a one-stop shop to appear for medical entrance examinations as well as to serve as a common admission standard to both government and private medical colleges. By striking down the NEET however, the decision restores the older system of separate medical examinations and separate admissions processes for different state and central medical institutions. More egregiously, it maintains the status quo on admissions by private and deemed medical colleges, which may not only conduct their own independent examinations but may also continue to profiteer from the scarcity of quality medical institutions by charging massively inflated capitation fees for admitting less meritorious students. Ruling that the MCI’s mandate to ensure ‘excellence of medical education’ in India extended only to the laying down of standards but not to actually conducting examinations, the majority found the NEET to be beyond the powers of the MCI as well as an unconstitutional interference with the right of private educational institutions to function autonomously. Yet, despite the majority’s strenuous reliance on the statutory text, the decision appears to be a classic case of form over substance. After all, many of the Supreme Court’s most well regarded decisions have been a result of creative statutory interpretations calculated to achieve just results. Given this past record, the majority’s literal and restrictive reading of MCI’s charter is not so much an indication of judicial discipline or helplessness as it is of judicial preference.
Troublingly, the NEET decision is one amongst a growing number of decisions, which point to a dichotomy in judicial speech and action. For instance, despite its pro-environment assertions, the Supreme Court preferred to allow the development of Mumbai’s mill lands as against leaving them as open spaces for the common enjoyment of all. Similarly, despite requiring elected representatives to make asset disclosures, the Supreme Court contested a similar demand in respect of itself and eventually gave in only after concerted political and public pressure. In the realm of socio-economic rights too, while the Supreme Court has been a trail-blazer in declaring the existence of un-enumerated rights to food, housing, employment and education, it has done little to enforce its declarations on a case to case basis. In the context of the NEET, this trend continues. Despite numerous Supreme Court decisions declaring education to be a strictly non-profit activity, the NEET decision fails to check the growing corruption and profiteering that are now commonplace in private and deemed institutions. Even as lakhs of medical students steel themselves for another round of frustrating examinations and admissions, hints in the dissenting opinion of inadequate judicial deliberations and undue haste could provide a narrow ground for a review of the decision. But whether or not the decision is formally reconsidered by the Court itself, its wider ramifications on medical education in India merit a comprehensive legislative response.
Bhargavi wrote a great piece yesterday on the tendency of legislatures to nullify judicial pronouncements by passing laws which overturn judgements/orders. She rightly pointed out this practice as a major issue which needs greater deliberation. There is however, one other issue which needs to be considered while thinking of possible solutions. This is the issue of balancing legislative supremacy with judicial intervention.
Legislative supremacy is probably the most important cornerstone of a democracy, and judicial intervention is the most important check on unbridled exercise of such supremacy. Constitutions in different countries balance the two through different mechanisms. Our constitution prohibits unbridled exercise of legislative power on issues affecting fundamental rights, and gives the judiciary the power to check the legislature from doing so. In essence however, the legislatures are democratically elected bodies, while the judiciary is unelected. While the legislature gains its legitimacy from the democratic process, the judiciary gets its legitimacy through the perceived correctness of its judgements. At any given point of time therefore, it is difficult to ascribe greater legitimacy to one institution over another, as there is no formulaic mechanism to judge the popular legitimacy of the judiciary and compare it with that of legislatures.
Legislatures retrospectively invalidate many rulings. Bhargavi points out some such laws which have nullified historically and constitutionally significant rulings. Some of these invalidations have apparently been made to protect the powers and privileges of politicians. However, many such laws (including the Vodafone incident, and numerous other retrospective laws on tax cases, especially in Punjab&Haryana) can also be said to reflect democratic preferences. In essence, in all such cases, the legislature seems to be saying that it feels that the judiciary has made an improper call in ruling the way it did. This may be easier to disprove objectively in some cases (where politicians clearly invalidate a correct judicial interpretation) than others (I for example, completely disagree with the assertion that political parties fall within the ambit of the RTI Act, read more here).
The important point is this: We should try and focus on mechanisms to make the legislative process more accountable and responsible. As long as we depend on the judiciary to intervene and correct “wrong” steps taken by legislatures, we are not putting sufficient pressure on the legislature to correct itself. I would argue that in the long run, incentivising legislatures to behave more responsibly is better than forcing them to make laws which make them more accountable. Doing so would in turn make the democratic process more virtuous and participatory. If lawmakers fail to consult citizens before passing laws, there should be sufficient public outrage which forces lawmakers to consult citizens.
The forum for reforming the democratic process should be direct engagement with the legislature. Using the judiciary as an instrument to dictate popular public policy goals does nothing to further the cause of popular democracy in the long run. It prevents popular engagement with substantive issues since the judiciary does not need to deliberate with, and convince the masses of the correctness of its decision.
Fighting it out with legislatures and politicians may be a tougher alternative, but it is definitely a more virtuous one.
Tags: democracy, democracy in india, government, government in India, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, Indian politics, indian polity, judicial intervention, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polity of india, polityinindia, retrospective laws, right to information political parties, RTI Act, RTI Amendment
On June 3, 2013, a full bench of the Central Information Commission (CIC) passed an order declaring six political parties to be public authorities[i], and consequently bringing them under the ambit of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI/ Act). Not unexpectedly, the Centre was quick to react. The UPA and the opposition were quicker to find unanimity on this issue. The media is rife with reports that the Cabinet has approved the introduction of an amendment to the RTI granting immunity to political parties from the Act.[ii] This episode echoes the numerous instances when the Parliament has resorted to retrospective amendments for nullifying the effect of inconvenient judicial pronouncements. It also reiterates the vulnerability of judicial pronouncements to the legislature’s power to turn the clock back in time. In this post, I trace the checkered history of retrospective amendments, and question the Indian legislature’s aggressive tendency of overruling bothersome judicial pronouncements by large-scale retrospective amendments to the law.
At the outset, it is nobody’s case that the legislature cannot enact laws having retrospective effect, for the power to do so is bestowed on it under the Constitution and fortified by numerous judicial pronouncements.[iii] This post also does not seek to argue for or against political parties being covered under the RTI. What this post questions is the righteousness of an obstinate legislative tendency to wriggle out of judicial pronouncements by making retrospective amendments, especially when redress against an unjustifiable order is available through appeal to a higher forum.
The proposed amendment of the RTI refreshes one’s memories of the numerous election validating laws of the 1970s that were enacted retrospectively for political convenience. One is reminded of the Rajasthan State Legislature’s act of retrospectively amending the definition of office of profit under the The Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RP Act) as applicable to Rajasthan. The amendment was made to override the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court that invalidated a candidate’s election to the Legislative Assembly on the ground that he held an office of profit as defined under the RP Act as it stood at the time of the election. The RTI amendment also reminds one of the landmark judgment of the Allahabad High Court invalidating Indira Gandhi’s election to the Lok Sabha on the grounds of her having engaged in electoral malpractices as defined under the RP Act, as it stood at the time of the election. Indira Gandhi appealed to the Supreme Court against this judgment. During the pendency of the appeal, the Congress-controlled Parliament passed a law amending inter alia the RP Act, so as to obviate the grounds that formed the basis of the Allahabad High Court judgment. The rest, as they say, is history. In both these cases[iv], the Supreme Court respected the unbridled power of the legislature to enact retrospective laws notwithstanding their effect on judicial pronouncements.[v]
Retrospective amendments are most commonly known for neutralizing the effect of anti-Government tax rulings. Of recent prominence is the retrospective amendment that sought to override the Supreme Court’s judgment in the Vodafone dispute, and bring offshore share transfers within the tax net. The amendment was a fall-out of a 2 year-long battle that the Government waged against Vodafone for recovering taxes in respect of an offshore share-sale transaction, and ultimately lost. In the tax regime, one will recollect numerous such retrospective amendments (some of them turning the clock as many as 30 years behind) that have altered tax liabilities of assessees. For instance, the amendment that brought renting of immovable property within the service tax net nullifying the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the Home Solutions case[vi]; the amendment that retrospectively taxed fees paid for services rendered abroad seeking to defeat the Supreme Court judgement in the Ishikawajma-Harima case[vii], the amendment that nullified the Supreme Court’s decision which held that once a price-classification list was approved by the Excise department[viii], the department could not re-open the matter for levying additional excise duty, to name only a few.
Legislative power to amend laws retrospectively for obviating the effect of a judgment has been justified on several grounds, namely the legislature being empowered to cure defects and infirmities in the law, absence of restrictive language in the plenary powers conferred on the legislature under the Constitution, and the inability of lawmakers to envisage every possible situation that the law may need to address. Often, the power of retrospective legislation has been used to plug genuine loopholes in welfare legislations. At the same time, there is no gainsaying the unforeseen consequences imposed on those who are targeted by retrospective laws, often on those who have fought until the highest court of the land to get their due under the law prevalent at the relevant time.
Even if one were to give the legislature the benefit of doubt for retrospective amendments to taxing statutes as they generally help the exchequer, the question assumes greater significance in the context of retrospective amendments made for political convenience. Particularly so, when the amendment is intended to benefit the amendment-makers alone. For instance and at the risk of digressing from the main issue of retroactivity, has the Government followed the regular process in connection with the potential RTI amendment that it would ordinarily follow whilst enacting any other law? Have consultations been held with all stakeholders? The only argument put forward by the Centre justifying the exemption of political parties from the RTI is the potential of its abuse. However, the legislature’s power to enact retrospective laws has equally been challenged in the past on grounds of potential abuse. This challenge has failed and Courts have repeatedly held that potential for abuse of a law cannot be a ground of challenge.[ix] Does the same principle not defeat the Centre’s argument for exemption of political parties from the RTI?
With the legislature aggressively amending laws retrospectively and with many such amendments being triggered by inconvenient judicial pronouncements, it is perhaps time for lawmakers to introspect on the generous use of its retrospective powers. Let me spell out why – because it will lend much predictability to the Indian legal regime, enable citizens to plan their affairs with more certainty, enhance confidence in the future of the regime, and more importantly, it will restore the sanctity of judicial pronouncements.
[i] The CIC declared the Indian National Congress/ All India Congress Committee (AICC), Bhartiya Janata Party(BJP), Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPM), Communist Party of India(CPI), Nationalist Congress Party(NCP) and Bahujan Samaj Party(BSP) to be public authorities under the RTI.
[ii] http://www.dnaindia.com/india/1868714/report-immunity-to-political-parties-cabinet-gives-nod-to-amend-rti-act; http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-08-01/india/40961224_1_political-parties-cic-order-rti-act
[iii] Article 245 of the Indian Constitution that empowers the Parliament and State Legislatures to make laws for the whole of India and the concerned State respectively does not contain restrictive language. The only exception to this can be found in Article 20 of the Constitution which prohibits the conviction or penalization of a person under a retrospective law.
[iv] See Kanta Kathuria v. Manak Chand Surana (1969) SCC 268 and Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) 2 SCC 159.
[v] In Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain (Supra Note iv), the Supreme Court upheld retrospective amendments to the RP Act, and struck down certain retrospective amendments made to Article 329A of the Constitution. However, the latter amendment was struck down on grounds other than retroactivity.
[vi] Home Solutions Retail India Ltd v. Union of India and Ors. 2009-TIOL-196-HC-DEL-ST
[vii] Ishikawajima Harinia Heavy Industries Ltd. v. DIT, Mumbai, (2007) 3 SCC 481
[viii] Collector of Central Excise, Baroda v. Cotspun Ltd. 1999 (113) ELT 353 (S.C)
[ix] In Kanta Kathuria v. Manak Chand Surana (Supra) responded to a challenge to the legislature’s powers to enact retrospective amendments overruling judicial pronouncements, as under:
“The apprehension that it may not be a healthy practice and this power might be abused in a particular case are again no grounds for limiting the powers of the State Legislature.”
Tags: democracy, democracy in india, government, government in India, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, Indian politics, indian polity, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polity of india, polityinindia, retrospective laws, right to information political parties, RTI Act, RTI Amendment
This post was first published in Takshashila’s Pragati – The Indian National Interest Review on May 3, 2013. The article can be accessed here.
Given the failure of many government legislations in achieving the objectives for which they were formulated, a case for institutionalising deeper public consultations in the legislative process has been made in the recent past. Currently, there are four entry points where citizens can participate in the legislative process: first, the identifying stage; second, the drafting stage; third, the legislative stage; and fourth, the post-legislative stage.
Civil society organisations can alert the government to the need for a particular legislation or changes in an existing law. The Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan, a farmers and workers group, ran a successful campaign for a Right to Information law, which was finally enacted in 2005. The recent anti-corruption agitation led to the introduction of a Lokpal Bill currently pending in the Rajya Sabha. The long-running Right to Food campaign by a network of NGOs has been instrumental in raising awareness about chronic hunger and the eventual introduction of the National Food Security Bill in 2011.
The government can also suo moto decide that a law is required in a particular sector. It may get inputs from specialised bodies such as the National Human Rights Commission and the Law Commission or appoint a group to study a sector and draft a law. These groups or bodies may hold consultations with independent experts and stakeholders. Furthermore, an individual Member of Parliament (MP) can also introduce a Bill in either House. This is known as a Private Member’s Bill (for example, Lok Sabha MP, Kalikesh Singh Deo introduced the Disclosure of Lobbying Activities Bill in 2013 to regulate lobbying activities). Although these are generally never passed, they act as signalling devices to the government, which may introduce its own legislation on the subject. It is possible for the public to approach their constituency representatives to advocate for a particular law.
Government Bills are drafted by the concerned ministry, which is then vetted by other ministries. There are also times when the government approaches an independent expert to draft a law. Recently, it appointed the Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission, under the chairmanship of Justice BN Srikrishna to reform the financial sector laws.
The government may publish the draft legislation in the public domain for feedback. Drafts of the Electronic Service Delivery Bill, the National Sports Bill and the Land Acquisition and Resettlement Bill were published for a specified time period (generally 20-30 days). It may also circulate the draft among a select set of stakeholders for comments. An individual MP may solicit public feedback on his Private Member Legislation. For example, Biju Janata Dal, MP Baijayant Panda uses his personal website and social media tools such as Facebook to publicise the draft of his private member bills.
There are few avenues of public engagement once the Bill is introduced in the Parliament. Since 1993, 24 Department-related Standing Committees (DRSCs) were formed to scrutinise Bills and other policies of the Government (before 1993 Bills were sometimes referred to ad-hoc committees for scrutiny). Generally most Bills are referred to these DRSCs, however, the presiding officer of the House has the discretion not to do so. For instance, key Bills such as the Special Economic Zones Bill, 2005 and the National Investigation Agency Bill, 2008 were not referred to a DRSC. In contrast, the Lokpal Bill passed by the Lok Sabha was sent to a Select Committee by the Rajya Sabha although it had been examined by the DRSC.
These DRSCs may solicit feedback from the public by issuing notices in key newspapers and the Gazette of India. The public comments are also tabled in the form of a report. However, the level of public engagement varies with different Bills. For instance, the DRSC scrutinising the Companies Bill, 2009 received 101 comments while only 10 submissions were received for the Armed Forces Tribunal (Amendment) Bill, 2012.
The government is not bound to accept the recommendations of the DRSC but individual MPs may introduce amendments to the Bill when it is being considered by the House. The MP may suggest amendments based on the DRSC’s suggestions or any public feedback.
Once Bills are enacted, ministries draft and notify Rules (also known as subordinate legislation) to enable their implementation. These Rules may be scrutinised by the Subordinate Legislation Committee, which is empowered to seek public feedback.
Post legislative scrutiny of laws is not mandatory in India. It may however be undertaken by bodies such as the Law Commission of India, the DRSCs or a specific commission appointed for the purpose who may hold public consultations. Recently, rape laws were reviewed by the Justice Verma Committee before an Ordinance was promulgated on the matter.
Many other democracies have devised meaningful ways to encourage public participation in the legislative process. In countries such as the UK, Australia and South Africa, it is mandatory to hold public consultations or publish draft Bills for comments. In fact, in South Africa it is a constitutionally mandated provision. In the UK, the Government publishes Green Paper and White Paper, which sets out its central ideas on the Bill. After introduction, it is compulsory to refer a Bill to a committee in the UK and the US. However, there is no such requirement in Australia, Canada and South Africa. Unlike in India and South Africa, it is mandatory for the Government in countries such as the UK, Australia and Canada to respond to the recommendations of the committee. While post legislative scrutiny in India is largely a matter of discretion of the Government, in the UK it is compulsory to do so within three to five years. In the US, legislative oversight committees review laws on a continuous basis. In Australia, most laws have to be reviewed within three years. Public comments are also solicited during the post-legislative scrutiny.
India can learn from the experience of these countries and tailor them to suit our requirements. There are many ways in which the government can deepen public engagement in the legislative process.
First, ministries can be mandatorily required to publish the draft Bill for a reasonable time and publicise it through different media. Along with the draft Bill, the ministry may be required to include available background information on the subject and facilitate access to legal and legislative record on the matter.
Second, it should be compulsory to refer a Bill to a DRSC or select committee for scrutiny. This could be at both the pre-legislative stage and the legislative stage. These committees should be required to hold wide consultations with a variety of stakeholders (NGOs, state and local governments, special interest groups, academics and legal experts). Public participation may be facilitated by increasing access to constituency offices, using a variety of media outlets to publicise the Bill and creating public participation offices that can interface with the public.
Third, in order to increase transparency in the feedback process, the government could be required to publish a report demonstrating how the inputs from stakeholders have been considered while formulating the law.
Fourth, most Acts should be subject to a post legislative scrutiny through public engagement every three to five years. This could be carried out if each Bill includes an Explanatory Note giving the criteria or outcomes by which the Bill could be judged for effectiveness. This responsibility could be given to a specialised committee.
Such measures will result in robust legislations, which shall need lesser amendments and will be successful in achieving the objective with which that legislation was enacted.
Tags: democracy, democracy in india, DRSCs, Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission, government, India, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, Indian politics, indian polity, Law, Lok Sabha, Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan, Parliament, politics, politics of india, polity in india, polity of india, polityinindia, rajya Sabha, Rules, South Africa, standing committees
This post first appeared as an article on Bar and Bench on July 31, 2013. The original can be accessed here.
Those following important policy developments recently will notice numerous announcements proposing new “independent” regulators. Beginning with SEBI in the early 1990s, and TRAI in the late 90s, a number of independent regulators have been set up. These include the Central and State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (CERC and SERCs respectively), the Competition Commission of India (CCI), the Insurance and Development Regulatory Authority of India (IRDA), the Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority (PFRDA), the Airport Economic Regulatory Authority (AERA), the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board (PNGRB) and the Tariff Authority for Major Ports (TAMP).
Recently, there have been proposals for a biotechnology regulator, a real estate regulator, acoal regulator, and even a roads regulator. In the financial sector, the report of the Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission (FSLRC) recommends an overhaul of the financial sector regulatory architecture by merging some existing regulators, and creating new ones. The most often talked about rationale for the creation of independent regulators is to ensure greater competition in a given sector, and to create a level playing field for different entities competing in that sector. This fairly regulated competitive market, it is argued, will be of greater benefit to consumers than the existing regime.
While this article does not seek to contest this above-mentioned premise of promoting competition, we need to examine whether the laws and processes creating these independent regulators actually create “independent” regulators who also remain accountable to Parliament. Since many of these regulators create appellate tribunals, or provide for appeals to High Courts and the Supreme Court, this article also discusses the implications of this regulatory sprawl on the existing judicial system. Lastly, the rationale for the creation of independent regulators needs to be debated carefully before more and more regulators are established. I argue that the long-term implications for the establishment of such a large number of sectoral regulators are something lawyers, policy experts and administrators need to examine carefully.
Independence and performance
Independence of regulators from the government is desirable to enable them to perform without political interference. This is especially important in India where the state is a major market participant in many economic sectors. However, not all regulators are equally independent, since the laws establishing them do not follow a uniform standard. Additionally, these laws rarely have the right mix of independence and accountability; a lot of these issues arguably stem from poor legislative design.
To be truly independent from the government, not only must the regulator be an independent statutory authority, it must also be financially and administratively independent from the government. The executive cannot be allowed to either interfere, or arm-twist the regulator to do its bidding. More importantly, since the onus of meeting the regulator’s objectives lies with the regulator, the government cannot be allowed to have unbridled discretion in how the regulator hires and manages personnel, and uses its finances.
For example, in 1999, TRAI, after holding extensive consultations issued its first Tariff Order (TO), a landmark for infrastructure regulatory agencies in India as it attempted to set tariffs to reflect costs more closely. After an uproar in Parliament, and opposition from other quarters, the Department of Telecommunications sent TRAI a 3-line note directing it to put its order on new phone rates on hold. TRAI refused. In response,
“[T]he government issued two gazetted notifications … The first related to salaries, allowances and conditions of service of TRAI officials. Here, instead of setting rules for the chairman of TRAI, it made different rules depending on if he were a retired judge of the Supreme Court, a retired chief justice of a high court or if he were a serving judge. It also cut down on the allowances for foreign travel [of TRAI], ostensibly in the wake of a recent Comptroller and Auditor General report.”
(Sourced from here)
Laws establishing regulators must therefore, be drafted to protect against such instances. At the same time, there must also be mechanisms to ensure regulators remain accountable to Parliament. The CAG for example, set up an institute in Jaipur to train officers in environmental audits. As a constitutional authority, the CAG is arguably responsible for auditing the government’s expenditure. While environmental audit may be desirable in itself, it is debatable whether such audits come within the CAG’s existing mandate.
The report of the FSLRC recommends physical, legal and administrative separation of the regulator from the government, implying that regulators must have independent infrastructure, personnel. With regard to financial independence, the FSRLC recommends independent sourcing of finances from sources such as fees. With regard to strengthening accountability, it recommends that regulators (a) be given clear, precise regulatory objectives, (b) explain their regulatory actions to the general public, and regulatory changes be made after prior consultation with the public, and (c) report to Parliament on how they fared on pursuing their regulatory objectives, and the outcomes achieved.
Independent tribunals, or some other appellate mechanisms are usually created to entertain appeals or disputes from orders of regulators. SEBI has SAT, the CCI has COMPAT, TRAI has TDSAT, the CERC and SERCs have the Appellate Tribunal on Electricity (APTEL), IRDAs appellate forum is SAT, appeals from PNGRB go to APTEL, and so on. While tribunals perform an adjudicatory function, and are thus not as prone to interference from the executive as the regulators, their relationship with the executive also needs to be looked into.
One such example is the use of APTEL’s use of its suo moto powers. In November 2011, APTEL passed an order exercising its suo moto powers, directing all SERCs to revise electricity tariffs regularly. Under the Electricity Act, 2003, all SERCs are mandated to revise electricity tariffs regularly on the basis of documentation provided to them by state electricity utilities. This was however not being done by most SERCs, and electricity utilities continued to suffer losses as tariffs remained low compared to the cost of producing and supplying electricity.
Significantly, APTEL exercised this suo moto power on the basis of a letter from the Ministry of Power complaining that most state distribution utilities had failed to file annual tariff revisions in time, and as a result, tariff revision has not taken place for a number of years in many states. It also stated that SERCs have not revised tariffs suo moto, and as a result, state distribution utilities are in poor health. While the final order was not an improper exercise of APTEL’s power, this instance can be construed as one where the central government was attempting to regulate the functioning of SERCs (over which it otherwise has no jurisdiction) by writing to APTEL.
The increasing specialization in the administration of justice through the establishment of sector specific tribunals also has repercussions for the broader system of administration of justice. As most legislations establishing these tribunals provide for appeals to the Supreme Court, such laws usually insist that the chairpersons or members of the tribunal, or both be (a) retired Supreme Court judges, (b) serving Supreme Court judges, (c) High Court chief justices, or (d) judges who have served in High Courts for a particular length of time. This arguably creates a high level of expertise in the dispensation of justice in these tribunals.
However, there is no mechanism by which members serving in such tribunals can be re-inducted (if not past the age of superannuation) into the mainstream judiciary. This arguably creates a situation where technical expertise in specific sectors is not channelized back into the mainstream judiciary. The creation of such a two-way process may become imperative in the long run if the increasing tribunalization of justice persists. The present system of promotion and induction into the judiciary emphasizes experience in practicing law or administering justice in different courts and on varied subjects. If tribunals are becoming an important part of the judicial landscape, it is only logical that experience as members of such tribunals also be given weight while considering appointments to the higher judiciary. This would also create a virtuous cycle where good judges would consider serving on tribunals for a period of time before returning to their service in the higher judiciary.
Rationale for independent regulation
The last, but perhaps the most significant issue remains the rationale for creating independent regulators. While in some cases there is a need for independent regulation, in some other cases the need for an independent regulator is less easily justifiable. The recent road regulator being proposed is one such example. The need for a regulator has been felt within the sector due to the large number of stalled road projects throughout the country. It was felt that the regulator should deal with “tariff setting, toll policy and modifications, compliance of service levels (for commuters), address public concerns.” The government being one of the parties to such contracts, cannot be the proper entity to mediate such disputes.
None of these functions i.e. ensuring competition, fair-play, and consumer protection however, are those that are usually entrusted to an independent regulator. In other words, the re-negotiation of contracts, regulations regarding toll collection, and other aspects of highway construction are not functions that need to be entrusted to a regulator in the usual course of events. These are not activities, the performance of which, enhances fair competition within the sector. The resolution if these issues may make the development of roads more efficient, but these functions are not those assigned to independent regulators. An official from the Planning Commission has stated that, “In case of roads, everything is decided in the contract itself, and be it the toll rates, other tariff. So, what do we need a regulator for?” Some commentators are justifying the need for such a regulator since the executive has failed to resolve these issues in an efficient and impartial manner.
We therefore need to carefully examine at what point the creation of an independent regulator is in effect an abdication of an essential state function. Many such state functions are questions of policy. They require political negotiation and decision-making. In essence they are policy issues, not regulatory ones. The state cannot abdicate such functions and hand them over to an unaccountable, unelected regulator because it has been unable to perform these functions effectively.
While there are no easy answers to these issues, they do need careful deliberation. There is therefore a necessity for ensuring that while attempts to promote competition within the economy are encouraged, the creation of new regulators and their linkages to the rest of the legal system are thought through.
Tags: bar and bench, democracy, democracy in india, government, government in India, independent regulators, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, Indian politics, indian polity, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polity of india, polityinindia, regulatory authorities, regulatory governance, regulatory governance in india, retired bureaucrats, SEBI, statutory regulators, TRAI
I had written this post in 2009 when Telengana first became a major political issue. I am re-posting it since major decisions about the creation of Telengana are underway. Minor edits and updates have been made and are provided in italics.
In my earlier post on the issue of Telengana’s statehood, I tried to provide a look at the high-handed exercise of the central government’s power to start processes for the creation of new states. In this part, I try to look at two issues (1) Constitutional provisions regarding state formation, and (2) centre-state relations in relation to state formation.
The provisions for creating new states, and changing the boundaries of new states are provided in Articles 2-4 of the Constitution. Simply put, a simple law passed by both the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha is enough to create a new state. However, only the central government (“President”) can introduce a Bill for this purpose. And before introducing the Bill, the states which will be affected have to be consulted.
The process of consultation followed has the following features: (1) The matter is referred to the legislatures of the affected states. (2) No specific time period within which states have to send their decision back to the centre has been mentioned in the Constitution. The central government can specify the time period while referring the matter. (3) The Constitution does not mention that the state legislatures have to agree to the proposed creation/alteration of states. The Parliament can therefore, pass a law creating a new state even if affected states do not agree to the proposal.
Lastly, the names of the states in the Union are mentioned in the First Schedule of the Constitution. Similarly, the Fourth Schedule lists the number of seats each state is allotted in the Rajya Sabha. Any law creating a new state would necessarily affect these two Schedules. Schedules to the Constitution are usually considered parts of the Constitution, and any change to the Schedules has to be done through a constitutional amendment. However, Article 4(2) of the constitution clearly says that no law creating or altering a new state will be considered a constitutional amendment.
The implications of these provisions are clear: for all practical considerations, the Constitution only requires that the central government should have a simple majority in both houses of Parliament. The obvious question to ask is whether this system is representative enough to create a new state, and this brings me to the second issue highlighted at the beginning of the page.
These provisions in the Constitution were created at a time when India’s security and sovereignty was at stake, when a number of independent states were forced to merge with the larger Indian state. There were obvious concerns about giving greater representative power to states who had recently agreed to be governed under the Indian union. Over the years however, threats of secessionist politics have reduced greatly. People almost throughout the country acknowledge themselves to be part of a greater Indian union.
However, maintaining the status quo in the Constitutional scheme has greatly reduced political space for raising legitimate regional or geopolitical aspirations within the country. The Parliament maybe the supreme representative platform for raising issues affecting citizens, it may however not be representative enough. Though there is no bar for state legislatures on discussing these issues, there seems to be little substantive gain from debating issues they have no practical control over.
Therefore, not only does the present constitutional scheme make it exceedingly simple for the central government to pass laws creating new states, the procedure involved also undermines the importance of local governments, constituents and state legislatures in the consensus-building process. It is little wonder then, that groups resort to violence to attract national consciousness.
Tags: amendment, Constitution, creation of new state, democracy, democracy in india, Federalism and Centre-State Relations, India, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian politics, indian polity, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polity of india, polityinindia, process to create new state, regionalism, secession, smaller states, social, sovereignty, state of telengana, Telengana, TSR
In 2005, the Government of Maharashtra banned dance performances in eating houses, permit rooms and beer bars through an amendment in the Bombay Police Act, 1951. The ban was recently struck down both by the High Court of Bombay and the Supreme Court of India as unconstitutional.
The High Court and the Supreme Court held the ban to be violative of Article 14 (right to equality) and Article 19(1)(g) (right to practice any profession or occupation). The courts observed that the amendment unreasonably prohibited dance performances in some establishments while permitting them in other establishments like hotels starred three and above. This classification seems to be based on elitist presumptions about the morality of people with lesser incomes and was held to be violating the right to equality. The courts also noted that the prohibition on dancing forced many establishments to shut down and rendered many women workers unemployed. Contrary to its purpose, the law forced many dancers to take up prostitution to earn their living. Thus, the law infringed upon the guarantee under Article 19(1)(g). Now, the state of Maharashtra is likely to revert to the licensing system for regulation of dance bars.
Below, I try to put the debate around prohibiting/regulating dance bars within the framework of various broader perspectives, not necessarily drawn from the judgments, which might help in a better analysis of this debate. My purpose is not to give a definite answer on this issue, but to separate and present the differing strands that get implicated here. Here are the different arguments:
Morality: Dances in beer bars and similar places are obscene and vulgar. They not only degrade women, but also lead to an increase in other immoral activities like prostitution and alcoholism. It can be said this argument belongs to the ‘Conservatives’, though I am wary of using this classification as our prejudices against being a ‘conservative’ may prevent us from fairly appreciating the merits of the argument.
Equality: Performances in dance bars are derogatory to women because they commodity and objectify women. They also often involve minor girls who are trafficked, exploited and forced into dancing in bars. This view is likely to be advocated most strongly by radical feminists who find the root of sex inequality in sexual exploitation of women and argue also against prostitution and pornography on these grounds. They deny that women choose these occupations with their ‘free consent’. This argument opposes bar dancing as being degrading to women not for reasons of protection of public morality, but due to concern for equality of women.
Practical offshoots: Allowing dance bars to flourish may enhance the occurrence of other undesirable activities or hinder implementation of other laws. For example, dance bars are seen as hubs of prostitution and human trafficking. They increase the vulnerability of minor girls and women to sexual exploitation. They may also lead to increased alcohol addiction and related crimes. These practical concerns call for regulation or banning of dance bars.
Right to work and livelihood: All persons have the right to work which includes women’s right to dance in bars. Banning bar dancing not only took away a form of employment, but also forced many bar dancers to take up prostitution to sustain themselves and their families. The ban also forced many establishments to shut down altogether, affecting the livelihood of other workers employed there.
Autonomy: Autonomy feminists seek respect for the agency or choice of women in entering professions such as bar dance, sex work or pornography. They reject the view that women do not take up these activities with their free consent. It is paternalistic to label what is the free choice of a woman as force or exploitation.
Free expression: Dance is a form of expression and prohibition on dance performances in certain establishments is an excessive restriction on the freedom of speech and expression of bar dancers.
Elitism: Selective ban on dances of certain types or in establishments most frequented by people belonging to certain classes or having lesser incomes is based on elitist assumptions about their morality. It is assumed that similar dance performances in establishments like five star hotels do not lead to illegal or immoral activities. It may also imply greater respect for the autonomy of women dancers of a particular class while viewing other women dancers as victims of exploitation. Such bans may stem from beliefs regarding the need to regulate the conduct of certain classes of people. Based on the position on the wider debate on bar dance, this argument may advocate either across-the-board increase or across-the-board decrease in the regulation of dance bars.
This is not an exhaustive set of views on the issue of bar dancing, but I have tried to cover a wide ground. I hope this puts the debate in a wider perspective and helps us avoid conflating the different arguments when responding to the debate.
Tags: Bombay High Court, Dance bar, dance bar ban, dance bars, democracy, democracy in india, Equality, Feminism, Freedom of speech and expr, human trafficking, immoral activities, india as an evolving polity, Indian politics, indian polity, Maharashtra, maharashtra dance bar, Mumbai, mumbai dance bar ban, mumbai law and order, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polity of india, polityinindia, prostitution, Supreme Court of india, Women's rights
This article first appeared in Frontline on July 24, 2013, and can be accessed here.
In my article, I examine the true intent behind giving the executive the power to promulgate ordinances, and how the use of this power has been at complete variance from such original intent. The misuse of this power over time is a strong incentive to examine ordinance making power as it currently exists. I argue that having strong standards of judicial review would be one tool to help misuse of this power:
“Ordinance-making power is not a new feature added to the Indian Constitution. Articles 42 and 43 of the Government of India Act, 1935, gave the same power to the Governor General. Members of the Constituent Assembly, having experience of abuse of such power, were understandably wary of including the same in the Constitution. Both Hriday Nath Kunzru and Professor K.T. Shah called for restricting the executive’s power to promulgate ordinances through greater oversight by legislatures. They were, however, overruled by Dr B.R. Ambedkar, who stated that ordinance-making powers were necessary since existing law might be deficient to deal with a situation “which maysuddenly and immediately arise”. According to him, the only solution was to “…confer upon the President the power to promulgate a law which will enable the executive to deal with that particular situation because it cannot resort to the ordinary process of law…” when the legislature was not in session.
It is clear that the framers of the Constitution envisaged ordinance-making powers only for unforeseen, sudden situations and where the executive required additional legal sanction to address the situation. The executive, however, decided to completely disregard this requirement of necessity for immediate action. According to data furnished in the Statistical Handbook of the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, more than 41 ordinances were promulgated during the term of the first Lok Sabha itself. Indeed, in the pre-Indira Gandhi period, that is, before 1966, more than 75 ordinances were passed by the Central government. The necessity of taking immediate action by promulgating ordinances has remained debatable at best through the years.”
Certain instances show how the use of this power has been at complete variance from the requirements of immediate necessity:
“The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) was created in 1997 first by an ordinance and then by an Act of Parliament. The Minister in charge stated that the ordinance route was taken since “…we were facing difficulties in attracting private investment without an authority like the TRAI. Private investors… were not convinced about our ongoing processes of privatisation and liberalisation.” Important as it is to send out a signal of commitment towards a particular government policy, in this case liberalisation of the telecommunications sector, it is hard to make the case that had immediate action by promulgating an ordinance not been taken, private investment in the telecommunications sector would never have happened.
Similarly, the Electricity Regulatory Commissions Ordinance was promulgated on April 25, 1998, one day before the government of the day decided to convene the next session of Parliament. The National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions (Amendment) Ordinance, 2006, was promulgated in January 2006, even though Parliament was to convene from February 16, 2006. In both cases, no satisfactory reason was given for promulgating these ordinances in haste…
..The National Tax Tribunal Ordinance was promulgated in 2003. As per the parliamentary debate on the National Tax Tribunal Bill, the ordinance was promulgated because various committees had recommended that such a tribunal be established, and as “…huge revenue is blocked in litigation because of pendency of appeal and reference is before the High Court, which has adverse affect on the national economy”. As one Member of Parliament pointed out, though a number of months had elapsed since the promulgation of the ordinance, no tribunal had been established at the time of the debate and no cases referred to it.”
These instances clearly reveal a misuse of ordinance making power that urgently needs course-correction.
Tags: democracy, democracy in india, Food security, food security ordinance, frontline magazine, government, government in India, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, Indian politics, indian polity, Ordinance, ordinance making power, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polityinindia, public distribution system
By Harsimran Kalra and Kaushiki Sanyal
This article was first published in the Hindustan Times on July 23, 2013 (see here)
The promulgation of the National Food Security Ordinance on July 5, shortly before the Parliament session, has raised many eyebrows. Political pundits are speculating that it is a last ditch attempt by the UPA to garner votes before the 2014 general elections. The UPA 2, on its part, has blamed the repeated disruptions in Parliament for this executive intervention.
Leaving political motives aside, the circumstances in which this ordinance was promulgated also raise the issue of propriety. An ordinance can be promulgated by the president only when Parliament is not in session and ‘immediate action’ is required. Therefore, it is in the nature of an emergency power, rather than a means to bypass the legislature. Given that Parliament is going to reconvene in a few weeks and there is already a similar Bill pending in Parliament, has the government acted within the lakshman rekha crafted by the Constitution over the executive’s law making capacity?
The power of ordinance was devised to overcome extraordinary circumstances, however, this power has not been used sparingly. Over 600 ordinances have been promulgated in India. Except, 1963, not a single year has gone by without the government resorting to the ordinance-making power. In fact, in 1994, 34 ordinances were promulgated, the highest in a year till date. Also, in this year itself, the government has promulgated four more ordinances, including the Criminal Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, which amended India’s rape laws.
Successive governments have given short shrift to the ’emergency’ test. Right from the inception of the Constitution, reliance was often placed on ordinance powers to deal, not with emergencies, but failures in negotiating the legislative process. Within the first 20 years after the Constitution was adopted, over 30 ordinances were promulgated a few days before Parliament began or after it ended. The two recent ordinances – Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance and the Food Security Ordinance – also hardly meet the emergency criteria. Both these ordinances seek to address deep-rooted problems of the country, which have been raised by many experts and activists over the years. The government has not shown any urgency in taking action over the years so it is not clear what recent emergency triggered their promulgation. Moreover, both these ordinances replaced related Bills that were already at an advanced stage in the legislative process. The Criminal Laws (Amendment) Bill was pending with the standing committee while the discussion on the food security Bill had already been initiated in the Budget session of Parliament.
Parliamentary process and democratic checks are circumvented when an ordinance is issued while a related Bill is pending in Parliament. Instances of this disregard for the spirit of the Constitution are many, right from 1954 when the Press (Objectionable Matters) Amendment Ordinance was promulgated. Other instances include the Essential Commodities (Special Provision) Ordinance, 1997 and the Indian Telegraph (Amendment) Ordinance, 2003.
In light of the public debate that raged around both the recent ordinances, due opportunity ought to have been secured to discuss the issues in Parliament. Although the ordinance has to stand the test of Parliament and be passed within six weeks of the session, this is more in the nature of a check in the political plan of the government. Passage of the ordinance on the floor of the House within the stipulated time becomes a face saving exercise instead of a deliberative, consensus building effort. What does the repeated use of ordinance-making power mean for a democratic nation with a robust parliamentary system? Are there structural weaknesses that need to be addressed so that governments are not allowed to rely excessively on ordinances? The time is ripe to devise measures that would deepen our democratic credentials such as allowing for wider public consultations; encouraging governments to engage with the Opposition to break the legislative log-jam and a stricter test of ’emergency’ for issuing an ordinance that would be open to assessment by the legislature.
Tags: Bill, Criminal Laws, democracy, democracy in india, Food security, government, government in India, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, Indian politics, indian polity, legislative logjam, Ordinance, politics, politics in India, polity, polity in india, polityinindia, public consultation, rape laws, right to food
This post was first published by Bar and Bench on July 23, 2013. The original article can be accessed here.
Recently, the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) prescribed a comprehensive format allowing investors and businesses to seek formal clarifications in connection with the Indian FDI policy regime. For the vast Indian legal community having an M&A, PE or a general corporate practice, the introduction of such a format is a half-hearted respite. Respite, because they need no longer content themselves with informal clarifications obtained through the interactive DIPP website. Half-hearted, because the format requires the querist to make ample disclosures, including the identity of the foreign investor, the Indian investee and details of the transaction.
Prima facie, the introduction of this format may seem to be just another procedural requirement mandated by the DIPP. However, at a more fundamental level, this format is perhaps the first step towards an organized system, which enables stakeholders and legal advisors to seek formal clarity in the Indian legal regime governing foreign investments. This post analyses how this format replaces a hitherto informal interface between stakeholders, corporate law firms and this policymaker, and argues for the establishment of a robust and institutionalized platform for an efficient lawyer-policymaker interface in this realm.
So, in a practice area equipped with veteran lawyers and experts, why is the need for a formal lawyer-policymaker interface so pressing? The answer to this question can be largely attributed to the trial and error approach adopted by the Indian Government towards foreign investment policymaking. In the backdrop of a constant tug of war between liberalization and protectionism, this regime has witnessed numerous policy flip-flops (case in point being the withdrawal of the policy decision on FDI in multi-brand retail within a month of its introduction in 2011); opposite stands taken by the policymaker and the regulator with respect to the same issue (such as the DIPP-RBI tiff on eligibility of instruments with built-in options for the purposes of FDI) and interpretation-disputes. Moreover, since policies in this field are frequently made without systematic interaction with stakeholders and are not generally preceded by statements of purpose, lawyers are often compelled to hazard a guess of the policymaker’s intent. Whilst FDI policy announcements initially comprised of multiple press notes issued at different times by the DIPP and the RBI, the regime has only recently matured to a point where all policy announcements are compiled in two comprehensive annual circulars issued by the DIPP and the RBI respectively. Sector-specific regulations and multiplicity of regulators (such as the IRDA which is in charge of FDI-policy making in the insurance sector, or SEBI which is in charge of some aspects of FDI policymaking for FIIs) further complicate the regime. Lawyers practicing foreign investment laws have had to navigate their way through these multiple circulars, potential policy U-turns, policymaker-regulator tiffs, and sector-specific regulatory guidelines on foreign investment to ensure that transaction structures are kosher.
In the milieu of a scattered legal and regulatory framework, what mechanisms are available to legal advisors for obtaining clarity on unclear issues in this multi-faceted regime? Common methods adopted by lawyers seeking clarity in this area are the interactive bulletin board and chat service introduced by the DIPP on its website in 2003. Stakeholders and legal advisors regularly post specific queries on the bulletin board to obtain answers within an average response time of 36 business hours. The interactive chat service functional on the DIPP website also allows public access to a DIPP official during office hours. These interactive features on the DIPP website have previously clarified substantive policy issues. For instance, in 2009, DIPP clarified a fundamental issue regarding the lock-in period on FDI in real estate through its informal bulletin board service, long before such clarification was finally crystallized in formal policy announcements. It is also not uncommon for legal advisors and stakeholders to schedule meetings with DIPP officials and obtain oral clarifications on their queries.
Whilst these are convenient methods of interacting with the policymaker and ingenious in their own right, the question regarding the sanctity of informal clarifications issued by the DIPP has always remained open. Can the DIPP reverse its position on views conveyed through the website or during meetings with DIPP officials? The answer is yes, this has been done in the past. Can a complex structure be effectively explained through the interactive guidance section of the DIPP website? Does everyone have the benefit of equal access to the regulator or the policymaker for seeking clarifications? The answer to both these questions is no, which begs the next question – Is there is a way to strengthen the clarity-seeking mechanism in the Indian foreign investment policy and regulatory framework?
The DIPP would do well by taking cue from the SEBI-implemented Informal Guidance Scheme, an institutional mechanism for those seeking clarity in the legal regime for the Indian securities markets. This Scheme allows market participants (including companies intending to get listed) to apply for interpretive or no-action letters from SEBI, sets a timeline within which SEBI may respond, provides for a hearing to the applicant before issuing a clarification, provides for publicizing clarifications issued to the applicant, etc. Although the clarifications and no-action letters issued by SEBI under the Informal Guidance Scheme apply only to the original applicant seeking it, their availability on a public platform has largely benefitted stakeholders in the past. For instance, under this scheme, SEBI has clarified substantive issues such as eligibility criteria for FII registration as also several interpretation issues under the Takeover Code. The Scheme, thus, puts in place a formal, transparent platform for interface, which strengthens the regime by bringing about greater clarity and consequent predictability.
The DIPP has, in the past, made laudable efforts (such as InvestIndia) for facilitating easier interface between stakeholders and itself in this sphere. Having said that, a regime that has witnessed multiple policy U-turns, inconsistencies and interpretation issues warrants an effective clarity-seeking mechanism. In the absence of such a mechanism, lawyers and stakeholders will continue to have to rely on oral or informal clarifications, chance meetings and casual relationships with the regulator or the policymaker for addressing their queries.
A scheme on the lines of the Informal Guidance Scheme introduced by SEBI would go a long way in plugging this lacuna. Of course, the efficiency of such a scheme would depend on the support of all the regulators concerned, the idea being that the scheme operates as a single window for those seeking clarifications on any aspect of the foreign investment policy or regulatory framework in India. Thus, for instance, a potential investor seeking to invest or an Indian promoter seeking foreign investment, in an insurance venture will not require to run from the DIPP to the IRDA seeking clarifications on an unclear aspect of the FDI policy on the insurance sector. With the assistance of an Informal Guidance-like scheme, he will be able to procure, in a time bound manner, formal clarity from the DIPP, IRDA and the RBI on all unresolved queries.
In addition to lending certainty and clarity to a regime widely perceived as complex and unpredictable, the scheme will facilitate equal access to the regulator and the policymaker for all. In the meantime, whilst the format recently introduced by the DIPP is a remarkable development in this space, it is only a small step on the long road to an efficient, resourceful and systematic clarity-seeking mechanism.
Tags: democracy, democracy in india, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, DIPP, FDI, government, government in India, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, Indian politics, indian polity, Informal Guidance Scheme, investor confidence, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polityinindia, RBI, SEBI
Citing the disruptions in Parliament, the UPA government decided to promulgate the National Food Security Ordinance on July 5. Under Article 123 of the Constitution, the President can promulgate an Ordinance when Parliament is not in session and there is need for ‘immediate action’. It is possible that the government has crossed a line of Constitutional propriety by promulgating this Ordinance since Parliament is about to convene in a few weeks and there is a similar Bill already pending in Parliament. This issue will be explored more fully in my next blog post. In this post, I propose to examine the key highlights of the Food Security Ordinance and whether it would deliver food security to the citizens of this country.
Highlights of the National Food Security Ordinance
- It entitles upto 75% of the rural population and 50% of the urban population to 5 kg food grains per month at a subsidized rate.
- Rice, wheat and coarse grains will be sold at Rs 3, Rs 2 and Rs 1 per kg respectively.
- Central government shall decide the proportion of the population to be covered in each state.
- State governments shall identify the eligible households in the states.
- Food grains shall be distributed to the eligible persons through the network of fair price shops under the PDS.
- In case the central government is unable to supply food grains to the state, it shall compensate the state governments who have to give a food security allowance to each entitled person.
Key milestones in India’s food security policy
The notion that access to food should be a right has its origin within the UN’s 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Food security exists when all people at all times have access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life.
India’s tryst with food security can be traced back to 1996 when the Supreme Court declared that the “right to live guaranteed in any civilized society implies the right to food”. This was followed by a writ petition filed in the Supreme Court by the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) Rajasthan in April 2001 against the central government, Food Corporation of India (FCI), and six state governments. The petition contended that the right to food was a fundamental right under “the right to life” provided by Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
Although no final judgment has been given, the Supreme Court has issued several interim orders in the case. On May 8, 2002, the Supreme Court appointed two Commissioners for the purpose of monitoring the implementation of the interim orders (see reports).
Both UPA I and II made food security an electoral promise and entrusted the task of drafting a legislation to the Sonia Gandhi led National Advisory Council (NAC). On October 23, 2010, the NAC made certain recommendations about the basic framework of the Food Security Bill. In response, the Prime Minister set up an Expert Committee under Dr C. Rangarajan to examine the Bill, which submitted its report in January 2011. It stated that it would not be possible to implement the NAC recommendations because of lack of availability of food grains and huge subsidy implications. The NAC however disagreed with it and prepared a draft Bill in June 2011.
The government finally introduced the National Food Security Bill, 2011 in the Lok Sabha on December 22, 2011. It was referred to the Standing Committee on Food, Consumer Affairs and Public Distribution, which submitted its report in January 2013. The discussion on the Bill had been initiated during the Budget session of 2013. The government also introduced a set of official amendments to the Bill, which have been incorporated in the Ordinance that was promulgated recently.
Ordinance: A hit or miss?
Opinion is divided about the need and desirability of the Food Security Ordinance. Some experts such as Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen are staunch supporters of the Bill given India’s malnutrition rates. Others such as Arvind Panagariya, Surjit Bhalla and Abhijit Banerjee have raised certain key issues regarding the need and impact of such a legislation. In fact, the debate on food security has dove-tailed with a larger debate about India’s governance priorities between two renowned economists – Amartya Sen and Jagdish Bhagwati (see here and here for the Sen-Bhagwati debate on re-distribution vs growth).
The criticism of the Ordinance mainly falls into the following categories: (a) purpose of the Ordinance; (b) identification of beneficiaries; (c) mechanism for delivering food security; and (d) the impact on the food subsidy burden.
Purpose of the Ordinance: The basic premise of the Ordinance is that India has a problem of persistent hunger which has led to high rate of malnutrition. Therefore, the government needs to provide the population with subsidized food grains. These premises have been challenged by various experts. Prof Arvind Panagariya, an economist at Columbia University, has recently attacked the notion that India’s child malnutrition rates are higher than that of Sub-Saharan Africa. Blaming the flawed measurement methodology of WHO, he makes a persuasive case that it is improbable that India is ahead of Sub-Saharan Africa in all other health indicators except malnutrition.
Other experts such as Arvind Virmani point out that persistent hunger is a much lesser problem than malnutrition. According to NSSO, in 2004-05, about 2% of households suffered from hunger at some point during the year. This Ordinance only addresses hunger while the focus needs to be on malnutrition which is a problem of a higher magnitude. Given the data on hunger, it is clear that malnutrition exists not so much because of lack of access to food but because of faulty diet. However, the Ordinance only focuses on providing cereals rather than nutrition rich food like vegetable, pulses and fruits. In fact, it may even have the unintended consequence of forcing farmers to grow cereals rather than fruits, pulses and vegetables.
Some experts have also pointed out that one of the major causes of malnutrition is the lack of sanitation. Unless policies focus on addressing this, malnutrition will remain a severe problem (see here, here and here). Others such as Prof Kaushik Basu have suggested that there is need to redesign how the government acquires and releases food on the market.
Identification of beneficiaries: While the Bill had divided the population into three groups (priority, general and excluded), the Ordinance only has two categories (those entitled to subsidized food grains and those who are not). However, this does not do away with the need to identify beneficiaries and thus can lead to inclusion and exclusion errors. According to some estimates, 61% of the eligible population is excluded from the BPL list while 25% of non-poor households are included in the list. The only way to completely eliminate inclusion-exclusion errors is by universalizing the scheme or by having a clear-cut exclusion criteria (see here). However, given the issue of financial burden, the problem of identification may be tackled through the biometric-linked Aadhaar number (see here and here). Basically, Aadhaar will enable the government to authenticate the identity of a person. It may reduce duplicate and ghost beneficiaries (non-existent beneficiaries). However, the success of Aadhaar in weeding out ghost beneficiaries depends on mandatory enrolment. If enrolment is not mandatory, both authentication systems can co-exist. In such a scenario, people will be able to opt out of the Aadhaar system (see here).
Mechanism for delivering food security: The Ordinance legalizes the PDS even though there is a large body of evidence about the inefficiency of the system (see Wadhwa Committee reports, Planning Commission report). These committees have pointed out issues such as targeting errors, low off-take of foodgrains by households, leakages and diversions of food grains to the open market, adulteration of food grains and lack of viability of Fair Price Shops.
Many experts have suggested other alternatives to the PDS such as cash transfer (see here, here and here) and food coupons. There is evidence that these methods have worked in countries such as Brazil (see here and here). Some advantages of these are: reduced administrative costs, expanded choices for beneficiaries, and more competitive pricing among shops. Also, allowing alternate methods could give more flexibility to the states to adopt the mechanism that suits their needs (see here).
Impact on food subsidy burden: According to the government’s calculations, the Ordinance will take the total food subsidy bill to Rs 124, 747 crore in 2013-14. However, there are other costs related to the implementation of the scheme that may not have been factored in such as cost of procurement, storage and transport of food grains. The Bill had given an annual estimate of Rs 95,000 crore as the cost to the exchequer. However, various experts refuted this figure. Their estimations vary from Rs 2 lakh crore to Rs 3.5 lakh crore (see here and here). The basic problem of having a high food subsidy bill is the effect on the fiscal deficit and inflation. Also, given the limited resources available, if the government prioritises one policy, it adversely impacts resource allocation for other policy goals. Therefore, policy choices need to be made based on what would give the most bang for the buck (see here) rather than on populist rhetoric.
It is imperative that the government considers these critiques while framing its food security policy; otherwise the Ordinance would be another lost opportunity to address a key problem faced by the poor.
Tags: amartya sen, Bill, cash transfer, democracy, democracy in india, fiscal deficit, Food Corporation of India, food coupons, Food security, government, government in India, growth, India, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, Indian politics, indian polity, inflation, jagdish bhagwati, NAC, national advisory council, PDS, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polityinindia, redistribution, Supreme Court, United Progressive Alliance
Crime and Punishment Parliament
This post is the first installment in a series on electoral reforms.
Last week was a blockbuster one for election law, bringing us not one, but two Supreme Court decisions with implications for convicted criminals, political candidates, legislators, and combinations thereof. On Thursday, the Supreme Court ruled that individuals lodged in jails or in police custody cannot contest elections. Earlier in the week, the same bench struck down a provision in the Representation of the People Act that protects legislators convicted of crimes from disqualification for three months from the date of conviction.
These decisions are timely. Upon taking office this past January, Law Commission Chairman Justice DK Jain stated that electoral reforms were going to be a top priority. Last month, the Commission appeared to make good on that promise releasing a [very brief] Consultation Paper on Electoral Reforms, and a notice soliciting feedback.
While any collective soul-searching into the deficiencies of election statutes is a positive development, it’s worth noting that this process has repeated itself many times in the recent past. Here’s a (possibly non-exhaustive) list of efforts since 1990: [i]
- Goswami Committee on Electoral Reforms (1990)
- Vohra Committee Report (1993)
- Indrajit Gupta Committee on State Funding of Elections (1998)
- Law Commission Report on Reform of the Electoral Laws (1999)
- National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (2001)
- Election Commission of India – Proposed Electoral Reforms (2004)
- The Second Administrative Reforms Commission (2008)
- Core Committee on Electoral Reforms (2010)
Taking note of issues from election financing to media regulations, the newest Law Commission paper declares the “criminalization of politics” to be its primary concern. Indeed, there is nothing new about the pervasive feeling that Indian Parliamentarians are a particularly compromised lot. In its 1993 report – part of which was deemed so explosive that it was never published – the Vohra Committee observed that “The nexus between the criminal gangs, police, bureaucracy and politicians has come out clearly in various parts of the country” and that “some political leaders become the leaders of these gangs/armed senas and over the years get themselves elected to local bodies, State assemblies, and national parliament.”[ii]
As this week’s Supreme Court decisions have highlighted, it is this last phenomenon – membership in Parliament – that many consider the most vexing manifestation of the mixing of criminal and political activity. Importantly, this week’s Supreme Court rulings do not resolve the issue. That’s because, while the Representation of People Act and this week’s decisions bar certain convicted criminals from holding office, the more intractable problem is what to do about the many MPs with criminal charges pending, who have not yet been convicted of any crime and are free on bail. According to a 2009 report of the Association for Democratic Reforms, 1158, or 15%, of all candidates contesting in the general election, had criminal charges pending against them. This included almost a third of all candidates in Bihar, as well as 27% of Congress candidates, 27% of BJP candidates, and 43% of ADMK candidates nationwide. During the election 162 MPs with criminal charges pending were elected (up from 128 in 2004), including 76 involved in “heinous offences such as rape, dacoity, and murder” (up from 58 in 2004).[iii]
The BJP and Congress each sent 42 MPs with criminal charges pending to the Lok Sabha. Of those MPs with serious (defined more broadly than heinous) IPC counts against them, there were 52 BJP, 31 Congress, 31 SP, 18 BSP, and 23 JD(U) MPs, as well as 9 MPs each from the ADMK, NCP and RJD.[iv]
The Law Commission’s recent Consultation Paper highlights two ways in which this could be addressed. Under the status quo contained in section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, MPs convicted of certain crimes will be disqualified for a period of time, based on the severity of the offence. The first alternative presented by the paper is that an MP or candidate could be disqualified much before conviction, when charges are framed by a court. The second alternative is the creation of a quasi-judicial tribunal that would “travel beyond the domain of criminality” and “evaluate the fitness of a candidate on the touchstone of certain enumerated standards.” In other words, not only criminal charges, but also complaints alleging a much broader spectrum of misconduct could lead to disqualification. Such a tribunal would issue orders disqualifying candidates based on the “preponderance of probability” rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Similar proposals have been made in the past as well.[v] The Election Commission and the Second Administrative Reforms Commission proposed a similar solution to the first alternative offered by the Law Commission. That proposal also contained provisions to prevent abuse. Only candidates/MPs accused of crimes punishable by 5 years or more of imprisonment could be disqualified upon having charges framed against them. Further, charges filed within six months of an election would not lead to disqualification.
There are a few striking features shared by these proposals. The first is the significant confidence they place in the capabilities of both judges and quasi-judicial tribunals to fairly adjudicate highly politicized questions quickly and without the format of a trial. The second is the tension between holding accused politicians accountable and the enormous potential for abuse. While it may be a popular idea, barring candidates only accused (and not chargesheeted or convicted) of crimes seems to be recognised as a bridge too far. Yet even the Law Commission proposals would go much further than Thursday’s ruling, which itself leaves plenty of room for abuse. In an editorial on Friday, The Hindu called that decision “a remedy worse than the disease,” noting that, “All that politicians in power now need to do to prevent rivals from contesting an election is to ask the police to file a case and effect arrest.”[vi]
One proposal that might avoid such pitfalls was proposed by The National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, in 2001. The Commission proposed the establishment of Special Courts to decide cases against candidates within six months. Candidates against whom charges are pending would be entitled to have their cases heard in the special courts, which would determine if a plausible prima facie case had been made against them or if the case was frivolous. BJD MP Jay Panda recently introduced a Private Members’ Bill in the Lok Sabha that would set up a fast track court within 90 days of charges being registered against an elected official.
The third striking feature of these proposals (and the whole discussion) is that within them lies a certain distrust of the electorate. Any such rule, by its very nature, assumes that, by choosing to elect MPs in criminal trouble, the electorate is either (1) unwise or (2) powerless to prevent those results. One problem with this (aside from its paternalism) is that it is empirically shaky. The ADR report states that in 2009, “Of the 608 candidates with the most serious criminal cases against them, only 76 won. The remaining 532 were rejected by the voters.”[vii] That is a win rate of only 12.5%. In ADR’s list of the top 20 candidates with criminal cases pending against them, all but two lost.[viii]
Finally, it is hard not to come away from the discussion wondering why there is such little acknowledgment of the much larger and more urgent problem at work here. That is, of course, the backlog of cases in the courts and the routine denial of speedy justice that plagues the entire judicial system. After all, if criminal cases were adjudicated more quickly, the existing provisions of the Representation of the People Act might well be enough. In 2009, Chief Justice A.P. Shah of the Delhi High Court said in a report that “it would take the court approximately 466 years” to clear the 2,300 criminal appeals cases pending in that Court alone.[ix] In 2011, there were over 72 lakh cases pending in the entire country.[x] The tainted state of the Lok Sabha is the most visible and most embarrassing consequence of this state of affairs, one that arguably affects each individual citizen far more profoundly than the election of criminal MPs.
[i] Background Paper on Electoral Reforms. Legislative Department, Union Ministry of Law & Justice. December 2010.
[iii] Final Report, Lok Sabha 2009. Association for Democratic Reforms. http://adrindia.org/research-and-reports/lok-sabha/2009/pdf-full-book-lok-sabha-2009-election-watch-compedium-state-election-watch-reports.
[v] See supra note .1
[vii] Supra note 3.
Tags: criminalization of politics, democracy, democracy in india, Election Commission of India – Proposed Electoral Reforms, election reform india, Electoral Reforms, electoral reforms in india, Goswami Committee on Electoral Reforms, government, government in India, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, Indian politics, indian polity, Indrajit Gupta Committee on State Funding of Elections, Law Commission Report on Reform of the Electoral Laws, National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polityinindia, supreme court election reform, The Second Administrative Reforms Commission, Vohra Committee Report, Vol. I: Recent developments and issues
In a recent post, I had written on why I think bringing political parties under the Right to Information Act is a bad idea. Economic and Political Weekly recently published my article on the same topic, where I critique the judgement of the Central Information Commission in detail, and argue that transparency in incomes and expenditures of political parties should be enforced by the Election Commission, rather than under the RTI Act.
While the CIC judgment follows developing judicial precedent under the RTI Act, bringing political parties under the purview of this Act opens a Pandora’s box that the CIC itself probably has not thought through. International practice demonstrates that the onus of creating more transparency within the political system is the task of independent election commissions.
The EPW article can be found here.
Tags: democracy, democracy in india, economic and political weekly, election commissions, EPW, government, independent election, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian politics, indian polity, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polityinindia, right to information act, right to information political parties, RTI Act, transparency of political parties
This post was first published as an op-ed by Mint on July 9, 2013. The original article can be accessed here.
Relief operations in disaster-ravaged Uttarakhand have ended and the time seems ripe to take account of the institutional frailties that have contributed to the ongoing human disaster in the state. Chief minister Vijay Bahuguna has been blamed for inaction when the disaster first struck and has also admitted that the state did not meet the norms for national disaster management. The Union government is also mulling changes to the Disaster Management Act, 2005, to make national disaster response more effective.
“The Union ministry of environment and forests’ (MoEF) expert appraisal committee (EAC) on river valley and hydroelectric projects (RVP) has considered a total of 262 hydropower and irrigation projects in close to six years since April 2007 when the new committee was set up to its latest, 63rd meeting in December 2012. It has not rejected any project in this period.” (Page 3 of the report).
Tags: centre state coordination in uttarakhand, democracy, democracy in india, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, indian polity, National disaster management authority, NDMA, politics, politics in India, polity, polity in india, polityinindia, role of uttarakhand government
The US Supreme Court recently gave a landmark decision in US v. Windsor holding Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, 1996 (DOMA), which defines “marriage” as excluding same-sex unions, unconstitutional. Here’s a quick summary of the judgment. The full 77-page judgment is available here. The decision also contains some lessons for the treatment of homosexual conduct in India, as this post highlights at the end.
The case began with a tax dispute. Two women residents of New York, Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer, got married in Ontario, Canada in 2007. Their marriage was recognized in the state of New York. Spyer died in 2009 leaving her entire estate to Windsor. Windsor paid $3,63,053 as estate taxes but claimed a refund seeking federal estate tax exemption for surviving spouses. This is where the controversial legislation DOMA steps in. Because DOMA excludes same-sex partners from its definition of “marriage” and “spouse”, the tax refund was denied. Thereafter Windsor challenged the constitutionality of DOMA.
The District Court, the Court of Appeals as well as the Supreme Court declared Section 3 of DOMA unconstitutional. In a 5:4 majority decision, the US Supreme Court held DOMA as violative of the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution. While the judgment also involved jurisdictional issues, I will deal only with the judgment on merits here.
The majority court noted that regulation of marriage has historically been within the authority of states. DOMA departs from the tradition of federal government deferring to this state authority. Although the statute does not prevent states from enacting laws allowing or providing benefits to same-sex marriages, DOMA holds a wide reach and extent by laying down a comprehensive definition of marriage for purposes of all federal laws. It affects over 1000 federal laws on various aspects involving marital status including social security, housing, taxes, crimi¬nal sanctions, copyright and veterans’ benefits.
The state of New York, by allowing same-sex marriages, confers dignity and protection on same-sex couples to enjoy their liberty. But the federal government has imposed restrictions and disabilities on them through DOMA. Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects liberty, which includes equal protection of laws. DOMA singles out and injures and degrades the very class of persons that the state considers entitled to recognition and protection, violating basic due process and equal protection principles.
The court observed that both purpose and effect of DOMA are to impose disadvantage, inferior status and stigma upon same-sex couples, whose marriage has been recognized by the state. Looking at the legislative history and title of DOMA, the majority noted that it is based on moral disapproval of homosexuality and aims to defend the heterosexual marriage institution. Further, the purpose of DOMA was to discourage state laws allowing same-sex marriages and to restrict the freedom and choice of lawful same-sex couples. DOMA treats same-sex unions deemed lawful by states as second-class marriages and also humiliates the children raised in same-sex unions. The majority concluded that the principal purpose and effect of DOMA are to impose inequality. And no legitimate objective overcomes this purpose and effect.
Thus, the court held that Section 3 of DOMA violates Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution. Notably, the court explicitly denied deciding whether DOMA’s intrusion violates the principle of federalism. The majority also cautioned that the judgment is confined to same-sex marriages that have been recognized as lawful by a state.
Four of the nine Justices expressed their dissents and held that DOMA is constitutional. The major points of dissent from the separate dissenting opinions are summarized here.
The judges pointed out that it is not clear what the majority’s conclusion of unconstitutionality is based on. There are three possibilities:
(1) Federalism. While the majority does refer to federal government’s departure from deferring to state authority, it itself denies basing its judgment on the grounds of violation of federalism.
(2) Equal Protection. If the decision is based on the violation of equal protection principle, the court has failed to address the basic issue of the level of scrutiny that must be applied to laws against same-sex unions. US equality jurisprudence provides three levels of scrutiny (strict, intermediate and rational-basis) that courts may apply to test the constitutionality of laws. The majority does not seem to apply any of these. Further, the court fails to appreciate the legitimate governmental interests behind this statute in ensuring stability and uniformity in the definition of marriage for the purposes of federal laws, especially in the presence of varying state laws on the status of same-sex unions. Relying on the title of the Act and snippets of legislative history, the majority strikes down the law based solely on its opinion of illicit legislative motive of harming a class of persons.
(3) Liberty and Due Process. The majority held that DOMA deprives liberty and violates basic due process principles. This suggests that the court used substantive due process, which protects rights and liberties deeply rooted in American history and tradition. The court did not assert that right to same-sex marriage is one such right. There is no constitutional right to same-sex marriages. Thus, this is a claim for recognition of new right from the judiciary, and deserves certain judicial restraint.
The dissenting opinions also highlight how this decision acts as a judicial invasion of democracy. The Constitution does not choose between opposing views on the institution of marriage. The dispute over same-sex marriages should be democratically decided by the people, acting through their elected representatives at state and federal levels, and not the court. The court casts the supporters of the traditional institution of marriage as bigots, wrongfully appropriating an important public policy debate.
Position in India
US v. Windsor inevitably reminds India of the pending decision from the Indian Supreme Court on an appeal against the Delhi High Court decision in Naz Foundation case. But there are important distinctions between the two disputes. The Naz judgment held unconstitutional Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) that criminalized consensual sexual conduct between same-sex adults, appeal against which is pending before Supreme Court. There is a difference between homosexuality as an identity, homosexual conduct that IPC criminalized and same-sex marriages. The issue of same-sex marriage is yet to be dealt with by Indian courts.
While decriminalization may be an easier issue than same-sex marriages as it spares decision on questions on the institution of marriage, the Naz judgment does seem to be much more legally and constitutionally grounded that the majority opinion in US v. Windsor. Perhaps a bit more nuanced analysis could have at least saved the majority from dissenting Justice Scalia’s remark of the court’s opinion being just “nonspecific hand-waving”.
Tags: criminalisation of homosexuality, democracy, democracy in india, government, government in India, homosexuality in india, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, Indian politics, Naz foundation case, Naz judgment, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polityinindia, same sex marriage, US v. Windsor
This article written by Roshni Shanker and Vasudha Reddy originally appeared in Outlook Online, and can be accessed here.
Earlier this week, India joined the list of countries that have denied asylum to Edward Snowden, the former National Security Agency consultant, stating that it sees no reason to accede to the request. The decision comes only a few months after Antonio Guterres, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, lauded India’s liberal approach to refugees and hailed it as an example for the rest if the world to follow. Despite not being a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“the 1951 Convention”) and its 1967 Protocol, India has over the years adopted a generous and compassionate approach towards asylum-seekers and has provided direct assistance to some 200,000 refugees from different countries. In fact, in the past India has extended asylum to some of the most controversial figures in history such as the Dalai Lama, Sri Lankan Tamil leaders, Aung San Suu Kyi’s political associates etc. Thus, the refusal of Snowden’s asylum request has ignited a furious debate on the law and politics underlying the issue. Many believe that turning a blind eye to the US government’s relentless pursuit of Snowden and denying him the right to asylum is a violation of fundamental human rights principles. However, others classify Snowden as a criminal and hold that a State has the prerogative to determine who they want to grant asylum. The debate has brought to light a number of legal issues, where the arguments of both sides merit consideration.
The right to asylum under international law is governed by the 1951 Convention. This is the key legal document which defines who a refugee is and enumerates his/her rights as well as the obligations of signatories. Certain tenets under the 1951 Convention have attained the status of customary international law, i.e. principles of international law which all countries have to adhere to irrespective of whether they have signed a specific convention or not. The most crucial of these is the principle of non-refoulément which places an obligation on States to not return refugees to countries where they face a serious threat to their lives or safety. Therefore, before denying an asylum request, States need to consider if the asylum-seeker qualifies as a refugee under law. Under Article 1 of the 1951 Convention, a person is considered to be a refugee if he has a well-founded fear of persecution owing to his race, religion, nationality, membership in a social group or political opinion.
The first consideration is whether the asylum-seeker’s fear of returning to his/her country is reasonable and justified i.e. “well-founded”. To determine this in the present case, one needs to examine how the US has treated others tried for similar offences. Given that Snowden has been charged by the US courts with espionage and leaking confidential information, his passport has been revoked and arrest warrants have been issued, the likelihood of him facing serious consequences for his actions is obvious. His fear of returning to the US is thus, well-founded.
The next question is whether the consequences Snowden is likely to face would amount to persecution. “Persecution” refers to serious violations of human rights such as torture, cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment. It is to be differentiated from “prosecution” where a person is brought to trial in accordance with due process of law. This is where opinion differs on Snowden. His opponents argue that if he is returned to the US, he will be given a fair trial with legal representation, as other similarly charged persons have been. Some also contend that he could have exercised his constitutional right to freedom of speech without breaking the law and therefore, he should be treated as a fugitive from justice. His supporters contend that as a whistle-blower, Snowden could not have used State mechanisms to expose State wrongdoing and point to the case of Bradley Manning, who has been subject to torture and severe ill-treatment while in detention, as confirmed by the United Nations Rapporteur. Therefore they believe that the consequences Snowden is likely to face would go beyond “prosecution” to “persecution”.
Finally, if it is determined that Snowden is likely to face persecution, then a nexus needs to be established with one of the five grounds under the 1951 Convention. Given the facts, Snowden can claim that he is either being targeted for his political opinion or his membership of a particular social group, in this case whistle-blowers. This is also under debate. Some believe that his actions do not amount to a mere expression of political belief but have jeopardized national security and diplomatic relations and for the same reason, he should not be regarded as a whistle-blower but as a spy. The contrasting opinion is that in exposing the imbalance of power between the State and its citizens he has expressed a political opinion against the extent of State surveillance, which also makes him a whistle-blower.
Even if Snowden qualifies as a refugee as per the said criteria, Article 1F(b) of the 1951 Convention denies protection to persons who have been convicted of serious non-political crimes. Here too opinion is divided on the nature of his actions, with those who believe that it was clearly political and others who view it as more criminal than political (thereby amounting to a serious non-political crime).
Had Snowden been physically present on Indian soil, the government would have been automatically bound to grant him asylum if the aforementioned criteria were met. However, since he has been making requests for asylum to various countries without being present there, and the 1951 Convention is silent on the subject of physical presence as a precondition for claiming asylum, States have been responding in various ways. While some States have required his physical presence to even consider his claim, India has considered and rejected it, suggesting that physical presence is not required. Due to the lack of binding international standards, States typically rely on their domestic asylum framework and established principles of international law. For example, the European Union has a common asylum framework which sets out a uniform procedure for handling asylum claims.
It is clear that Snowden’s quest for asylum has thrown up many complex legal issues. The determination of his legal status cannot be resolved easily and warrants extensive legal analysis. External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid, has stated that India has a “very careful and restrictive [asylum] policy”, which Snowden presumably did not conform to. However, India has never had a domestic legal framework for extending asylum. Further, India’s unequivocal denial of the asylum request within a day of it being made raises concerns over India’s political will overriding principled considerations and over whether the request was properly assessed under international law. In the absence of a clear domestic framework for extending asylum, decisions such as that taken on the Snowden case give the impression of the process being ad-hoc and arbitrary, thereby underscoring the urgent need for such a framework.
Roshni Shanker & Vasudha Reddy run a refugee legal aid centre in New Delhi called Ara Legal Initiative and were formerly UNHCR lawyers. They can be contacted at office AT araleagl DOT in
Tags: 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, ARA Legal, democracy, democracy in india, edward snowden asylum india, edward snowden asylum request, government, government in India, human rights, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, indian polity, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polityinindia, salman khurshid, san suu kyi, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
This post first appeared as an article on Bar and Bench on July 2, 2013, and can be accessed at their website here.
News reports have indicated the government’s plan to establish a judicial appointments commission (“JAC”) for the appointment of Supreme Court and High Court judges. If established, the body would not only mark a sharp change from the current appointment process, but also from the constitutionally mandated procedure for appointment. The system at present however, is also markedly different from what the Indian constitution mandates. It remains to be seen whether the proposed JAC leads to better outcomes.
The crucial aspect in measuring outcomes is however, the correct determination of the desiredoutcome. In order to assess this issue, certain other considerations need to be examined, which are explained in this paper. These are: (a) constitutional provisions, and the original process of appointment, (b) the present process of appointment and their historical development, (c) the views of different experts and commissions on the issue, and (d) the determination of the desired outcome, and whether the proposed JAC would lead to this desired outcome.
Section 124(2) of the Constitution provides a fairly neat method of appointing judges to the Supreme Court. It states that the President (read the Executive) shall appoint a judge of the Supreme Court after consultation with such judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts as he may deem necessary. The Chief Justice of India (“CJI”) has to be mandatorily consulted regarding the appointment of every judge other than to the position of the CJI. Similarly, under Article 217(1), the President of India appoints judges to High Courts after consultation with the CJI, the Governor of the State, and the Chief Justice of the High Court (for the appointment of a judge other than as Chief Justice of that High Court).
The primary authority for the appointment of judges under the Constitution is thus the President, or the central executive (“Executive”). The Executive has to discharge this function in consultation with other constitutional functionaries. Notice however, that this consultation process is not mandatory (apart from with the CJI for Supreme Court judges, and the Chief Justices of the High Courts for High Court judges). The Constitution also does not state that the Executive has to abide by the opinion of other constitutional functionaries while appointing judges.
Over the years though, this position has been completely deviated from, for reasons many consider completely justified.
Present process and origin of process
The Indian Constitution, like many other constitutions, creates a separation of powers between different wings of the state i.e. Executive, Legislature, and Judiciary. However, all three wings remain accountable to each other in some form or the other. The central and state executives for example, are directly accountable to Parliament and state legislatures respectively. Similarly, while the judiciary is independent of the Legislature and the Executive in most aspects, the power of appointment vests with the Executive as explained above, and the power of removal rests with Parliament. This system is designed to enable the judiciary to remain accountable to the democratic process in some measure.
The present process of appointments arose out of a perceived need to remedy certain ills that became apparent with the constitutionally mandated procedure. Seervai’s Constitutional Law of India (4th Ed., Vol. 3) records that the day before CJI Venkataramaiah retired from the Supreme Court, he gave an interview stating:
“…such judges are appointed, as are willing to be ‘influenced’ by lavish parties and whisky bottles…in every High Court, there are at least 4 to 5 judges who are practically out every evening, wining and dining either at a lawyer’s house or a foreign embassy…practically in all 22 High Courts, close relations of judges are thriving. There are allegations that certain judgements have been influenced though they have not been directly engaged in lawyers in such cases.”
This extract encapsulates, in brief, the concerns regarding the improper behaviour and conduct of judges in the higher judiciary. Though a number of past judgements had interpreted the respective powers of constitutional functionaries regarding the transfer and re-appointment of judges, the case of Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record v. Union of India (“Judges Appointment case”) is responsible for moving towards the present system of appointment of judges. I summarise the main points laid down by the court below:
1. The process of appointment of judges “is an integrated participatory consultative process”. All constitutional functionaries must perform this duty collectively to reach an agreed decision.
2. The proposal for appointment of a judge must arise from the CJI (for appointment of a Supreme Court judge) and from the Chief Justice of a High Court (for a High Court judge).
3. In the event of conflicting opinions, the opinion of the CJI has primacy. No appointment can be made without the concurrence of the CJI.
4. A collegium system of appointment must be initiated.
In 1998, in the case In Re Presidential Reference: Under Article 143(1) of the Constitution of India (“2nd Judges Appointment Case”), the Supreme Court further evolved this doctrine and created a system wherein judges would be appointed by a collegium consisting of the four senior-most judges of the Supreme Court. Though the Executive would make the actual appointment, it would have no other role in the appointment of judges to the High Court or Supreme Court. As recently as January 2013, the Supreme Court rejected a plea to revisit the Judges Appointment Cases (read more here).
These two cases therefore departed considerably from the procedure enshrined in the Constitution. Many have argued that insulation of appointments from executive influence is necessary to promote judicial independence, but it is debatable whether this insulation has led to a qualitative betterment in the conduct of the judiciary as a whole, or the quality of judgements. Additionally, various administrative and structural issues have been highlighted. Over the years, political parties, experts and commissions have proposed a number of mechanisms for the appointment of judges. It may be worthwhile to consider them briefly below.
The table below encapsulates in brief the proposals of various bodies regarding the appointment of judges.
|Law Commission – 80thReport (1979)||Appointment process in High Courts to be initiated by CJ of that High Court. Constitutional procedure to be followed in other aspects. The Chief Minister of the state is free to disagree with choice of the CJ. One-third of judges appointed should be from outside the state.Interestingly, the report mentioned the need for a “Judges Appointment Commission”, for eliminating the “sway of political or other extraneous considerations…”.|
|Law Commission – 121stReport (1987)||Recommended the establishment of a National Judicial Service Commission. The CJI would be the Chairman, and there would be three senior-most judges of the Supreme Court, three senior-most CJs of the High Courts, the Minister for Law and Justice, the Attorney General of India, the outgoing CJI, and a legal academic in the Commission. Additionally, while deciding a vacancy in a particular High Court, the CJ of the High Court, the Chief Minister and Governor of that state must be co-opted into the deliberations of the Commission.|
|67th Constitutional Amendment Bill, 1990||Proposed the creation of a National Judicial Commission composed of serving judges headed by the CJI.|
|Law Commission – 214thReport (2008)||Recommended restoration of the original constitutional procedure to be followed in wake of the Supreme Court’s decisions in the Judges Appointments cases.|
|National Advisory Council Paper titled “A National Judicial Commission: Judicial Appointments and Oversight”||Recommended creation of National Judicial Commission with the Vice-President as Chairperson, and the Prime Minister, Speaker of Lok Sabha, Law Minister, Leaders of Opposition from both Houses of Parliament, and the CJI as other members. The President would have the power to reject a candidate recommended by the NJC.|
As may be noticed from the table above, all the reports above emphasize the need for a broad-based consultative framework for the appointment of judges. Significantly, all these reports have also been informed by practices in other countries, most of which allow for some sort of a consultative process between members of the judiciary, executive, legislature, and civil society. The process being proposed by the Central Government at present also aims to create a broad-based consultative process.
According to news reports (here and here), the proposed Judicial Appointments Commission will probably have the Prime Minister, the Leader of Opposition, the Law Minister, the CJI, four other senior judges of the Supreme Court, and a prominent jurist as members. The process therefore seeks to give the executive and legislature a greater role in the appointment of judges than the collegium system.
The question however remains: what is the desired outcome? The proposed system seeks to increase democratic accountability in the process of appointments. This is thought to be necessary due to the widespread perception that judicial appointments remain non-transparent, that delays in appointments occur due to the current in-house process of appointment, leading to a huge backlog of pending cases, and finally, that democratic accountability is an end in itself.
But is democratic accountability an end in itself? Does democratic accountability also not seek to further other expectations we may have from the judiciary, such as the writing of better judgements, decrease in backlogs and an increase in access to courts? If yes, would these goals be served merely by the creation of a Judicial Appointments Commission? The point I am trying to make is whether the judiciary can be made more accountable, more accessible, and qualitatively better without tinkering with the present appointment process? Those in favour of changing the status quo would point out that the present system is a complete departure from the constitutionally prescribed procedure. The simplest response is that the process being contemplated would also require a constitutional amendment!
There is a great need to reform the present system of appointment, in order to make it more transparent, and to achieve other social and economic ends. However, we need to think through the available alternatives for meeting our goals, and ensure that the legislative measures we take actually help in the realization of those goals.
Tags: 67th Constitutional Amendment Bill 1990, A National Judicial Commission: Judicial Appointments and Oversight, administrative reforms commission, appointment and transfer of judges, appointment of judges in india, corruption in judiciary, democracy, democracy in india, government, government in India, In Re Presidential Reference: Under Article 143(1) of the Constitution of India, independence of judiciary, india as an evolving polity, Indian democracy, Indian government, Indian politics, indian polity, judges of supreme court, judges of supreme court and high court, Judicial Appointments Commission, Law commission of india, national advisory council, National Judicial Commission, politics, politics in India, polity in india, polityinindia, Seervai’s Constitutional Law of India, Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record v. Union of India, Supreme Court of india
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