Tag Archives: FDI

Foreign direct investment in railways: Does national security matter?

9 Feb

This post has been written by Mr. Pratik Datta.


Present Indian laws ’prohibit’ foreign direct investment (FDI) in railways (other than mass rapid transport system). Of late there has been growing expectation that the Indian Government might allow 100% FDI in construction and maintenance of railway projects (but not in operations). Suddenly the optimism seems to have yielded to apprehensions of ’national security’ concerns (link). These concerns reportedly stem out of potential Chinese investment in Indian railways. India and China have long standing border disputes. The deep penetration of the Indian railways into some remote border areas seem to be bothering the Government. But is this apprehension justified? Do other countries restrict foreign investment based on ’national security’ concerns? Is there no other option but to prohibit foreign investment in railways? These are some of the questions that I will try to answer in this post.

Do other jurisdictions restrict foreign investment on grounds of “national security”?


Let’s take the example of US. Since World War II, US has traditionally been an ardent advocate of reduced restrictions on foreign investments. However, at different points of time, specific concerns over national security have shaped US policies on foreign investment. For instance, in 1970s, the US Congress had growing concerns about the increasing foreign investment into US from OPEC countries. This led to the establishment of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the US (CFIUS) in 1975 to oversee the national security implications of foreign investment. In 1988, amidst concerns over acquisition of some US companies by Japanese firms, the Congress approved the Exon-Florio provision that granted the President the power to block cross-border mergers with, or acquisition and takeovers of, certain US companies that might threaten national security.

Subsequently, the 9/11 attacks led to the passage of the Patriot Act, 2001 which declared certain sectors as ’critical infrastructure’ (including transportation) necessary for ’national defense, continuity of government, economic prosperity, and quality of life in the United States ’. The following year, the power to identify ’critical infrastructures’ was transferred to the Department of Homeland Security under the Homeland Security Act, 2002. In 2006, the proposed purchase of the US port operations of British-owned Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company by Dubai Port World fuelled much discontent among US policymakers. This culminated in the enactment of the Foreign Investment and National Security Act, 2007 that changed the way foreign direct investments are reviewed. First, it included ’critical infrastructures’ and ’homeland security’ as areas of concern comparable with ’national security’ under Exon-Florio provision. Second, it requires CFIUS to investigate all foreign investments involving foreign entities owned or controlled by a foreign government regardless of the nature of business. Therefore, it can safely be concluded that ’national security’ concerns may restrict the free flow of foreign investment into US.

Is US an exception?


An OECD study across 39 jurisdictions found that transportation is the most targeted sector all the jurisdictions have discriminatory foreign investment policy in this sector. The discrimination usually takes three forms: blanket restrictions, sector-specific licensing provisions or contracting, and trans-sectoral measures. The study however concludes that discriminatory investment rules serve as a policy of last resort if all other mechanisms fail, investment policy can be used to prevent investments by foreign entities that may pose risks.

Can it be argued that there is a legitimate national security reason to prevent FDI in Indian railways?


Railways and airways are both modes of transportation. Yet under the present Indian laws, FDI in railways is prohibited while it is allowed in ’air transport service’. In ’scheduled air transport service’ 49% FDI is allowed under automatic route and in ’non-scheduled air transport service’ 74% FDI is allowed – 49% under automatic route and beyond it through approval. Moreover, in ’helicopter services/seaplane services requiring DGCA approval’, 100% FDI is allowed under automatic route. If FDI is not prohibited for air transport on grounds of ’national security’, it is difficult to see why railways should be treated differently.

The prohibition of FDI in railways can be traced back to the Industrial Policy Resolution (IPR), 1948. Railways along with atomic energy, arms and ammunitions were reserved only for state monopolies. The position was reiterated in Schedule A of IPR 1956, which expanded the list of industries (to include air transport also) the ’future development of which would be the exclusive responsibility of the state’. The reason for including ’public utilities services’ within Schedule A was for ’planned and rapid development’ and to provide ’investment on a scale which only the State’ could provide. Evidently, national security never motivated the policy makers to include railways as a state monopoly in the first place. So, it is hard to justify the current blanket ’prohibition’ of FDI in railways on grounds of ’national security’.

If FDI in Indian railways is allowed, would it compromise ’national security’ concerns?


Under the present regime, FDI can come in automatically (automatic route) or through Government approval (approval route). If FDI in railways is allowed under approval route, ’national security’ concerns can be looked into by Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB). If it thinks the concerns are valid, it can reject the FDI proposal. If there is no such valid concern, FDI will be allowed. Subsequent to the FIPB approval, if any genuine ’national security’ concern arises, the foreign investment itself will not be protected under bilateral investment treaties (BITs). For example, Art. 14 of the India-China BIT provides for the ’exception’ clause which excludes from the scope of the treaty any action under domestic laws for protection of ’essential security interests’ by a Contracting Party. The ICSID held in CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic (link) (in paragraph 360) that ’essential security interests’ include ’national security’. Therefore, India can take appropriate actions under domestic law (even expropriate the foreign investment) if there are valid ’national security’ concerns.

To conclude, national security is certainly a crucial issue for foreign investment into any country including India. However, apprehension in itself should not be a ground to prohibit foreign investment. The current legal regime gives enough room to India to address these concerns within the rule of law framework. Imposing a blanket prohibition on foreign investment in Indian railways because of vague national security concerns is neither necessary nor justified.


The DIPP and Indian FDI policy – The long road to clarity

24 Jul

This post was first published by Bar and Bench on July 23, 2013. The original article can be accessed here.


Recently, the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) prescribed a comprehensive format allowing investors and businesses to seek formal clarifications in connection with the Indian FDI policy regime. For the vast Indian legal community having an M&A, PE or a general corporate practice, the introduction of such a format is a half-hearted respite. Respite, because they need no longer content themselves with informal clarifications obtained through the interactive DIPP website. Half-hearted, because the format requires the querist to make ample disclosures, including the identity of the foreign investor, the Indian investee and details of the transaction.

Prima facie, the introduction of this format may seem to be just another procedural requirement mandated by the DIPP. However, at a more fundamental level, this format is perhaps the first step towards an organized system, which enables stakeholders and legal advisors to seek formal clarity in the Indian legal regime governing foreign investments. This post analyses how this format replaces a hitherto informal interface between stakeholders, corporate law firms and this policymaker, and argues for the establishment of a robust and institutionalized platform for an efficient lawyer-policymaker interface in this realm.

So, in a practice area equipped with veteran lawyers and experts, why is the need for a formal lawyer-policymaker interface so pressing? The answer to this question can be largely attributed to the trial and error approach adopted by the Indian Government towards foreign investment policymaking. In the backdrop of a constant tug of war between liberalization and protectionism, this regime has witnessed numerous policy flip-flops (case in point being the withdrawal of the policy decision on FDI in multi-brand retail within a month of its introduction in 2011); opposite stands taken by the policymaker and the regulator with respect to the same issue (such as the DIPP-RBI tiff on eligibility of instruments with built-in options for the purposes of FDI) and interpretation-disputes. Moreover, since policies in this field are frequently made without systematic interaction with stakeholders and are not generally preceded by statements of purpose, lawyers are often compelled to hazard a guess of the policymaker’s intent. Whilst FDI policy announcements initially comprised of multiple press notes issued at different times by the DIPP and the RBI, the regime has only recently matured to a point where all policy announcements are compiled in two comprehensive annual circulars issued by the DIPP and the RBI respectively. Sector-specific regulations and multiplicity of regulators (such as the IRDA which is in charge of FDI-policy making in the insurance sector, or SEBI which is in charge of some aspects of FDI policymaking for FIIs) further complicate the regime. Lawyers practicing foreign investment laws have had to navigate their way through these multiple circulars, potential policy U-turns, policymaker-regulator tiffs, and sector-specific regulatory guidelines on foreign investment to ensure that transaction structures are kosher.

In the milieu of a scattered legal and regulatory framework, what mechanisms are available to legal advisors for obtaining clarity on unclear issues in this multi-faceted regime? Common methods adopted by lawyers seeking clarity in this area are the interactive bulletin board and chat service introduced by the DIPP on its website in 2003. Stakeholders and legal advisors regularly post specific queries on the bulletin board to obtain answers within an average response time of 36 business hours. The interactive chat service functional on the DIPP website also allows public access to a DIPP official during office hours. These interactive features on the DIPP website have previously clarified substantive policy issues. For instance, in 2009, DIPP clarified a fundamental issue regarding the lock-in period on FDI in real estate through its informal bulletin board service, long before such clarification was finally crystallized in formal policy announcements. It is also not uncommon for legal advisors and stakeholders to schedule meetings with DIPP officials and obtain oral clarifications on their queries.

Whilst these are convenient methods of interacting with the policymaker and ingenious in their own right, the question regarding the sanctity of informal clarifications issued by the DIPP has always remained open. Can the DIPP reverse its position on views conveyed through the website or during meetings with DIPP officials? The answer is yes, this has been done in the past. Can a complex structure be effectively explained through the interactive guidance section of the DIPP website? Does everyone have the benefit of equal access to the regulator or the policymaker for seeking clarifications? The answer to both these questions is no, which begs the next question – Is there is a way to strengthen the clarity-seeking mechanism in the Indian foreign investment policy and regulatory framework?

The DIPP would do well by taking cue from the SEBI-implemented Informal Guidance Scheme, an institutional mechanism for those seeking clarity in the legal regime for the Indian securities markets. This Scheme allows market participants (including companies intending to get listed) to apply for interpretive or no-action letters from SEBI, sets a timeline within which SEBI may respond, provides for a hearing to the applicant before issuing a clarification, provides for publicizing clarifications issued to the applicant, etc. Although the clarifications and no-action letters issued by SEBI under the Informal Guidance Scheme apply only to the original applicant seeking it, their availability on a public platform has largely benefitted stakeholders in the past. For instance, under this scheme, SEBI has clarified substantive issues such as eligibility criteria for FII registration as also several interpretation issues under the Takeover Code. The Scheme, thus, puts in place a formal, transparent platform for interface, which strengthens the regime by bringing about greater clarity and consequent predictability.

The DIPP has, in the past, made laudable efforts (such as InvestIndia) for facilitating easier interface between stakeholders and itself in this sphere. Having said that, a regime that has witnessed multiple policy U-turns, inconsistencies and interpretation issues warrants an effective clarity-seeking mechanism. In the absence of such a mechanism, lawyers and stakeholders will continue to have to rely on oral or informal clarifications, chance meetings and casual relationships with the regulator or the policymaker for addressing their queries.

A scheme on the lines of the Informal Guidance Scheme introduced by SEBI would go a long way in plugging this lacuna. Of course, the efficiency of such a scheme would depend on the support of all the regulators concerned, the idea being that the scheme operates as a single window for those seeking clarifications on any aspect of the foreign investment policy or regulatory framework in India. Thus, for instance, a potential investor seeking to invest or an Indian promoter seeking foreign investment, in an insurance venture will not require to run from the DIPP to the IRDA seeking clarifications on an unclear aspect of the FDI policy on the insurance sector. With the assistance of an Informal Guidance-like scheme, he will be able to procure, in a time bound manner, formal clarity from the DIPP, IRDA and the RBI on all unresolved queries.

In addition to lending certainty and clarity to a regime widely perceived as complex and unpredictable, the scheme will facilitate equal access to the regulator and the policymaker for all. In the meantime, whilst the format recently introduced by the DIPP is a remarkable development in this space, it is only a small step on the long road to an efficient, resourceful and systematic clarity-seeking mechanism.

Law to regulate lobbying in India

29 May

Recent news reports suggest that the committee investigating the case of Walmart lobbying the Indian government to allow FDI in the retail sector is going to submit its report shortly.  It is reported that the committee could not find evidence of Walmart bribing any government official or indulging in any unlawful activity.  However, the committee may recommend that the government frame rules to regulate lobbying in India.

In this context, Harsimran Kalra and I published an article in the Oxford India Policy Blog that made a case for regulating lobbying in India.  It also flagged some issues that needs to be debated widely before a law on lobbying is drafted.

The full article can be accessed here.

An excerpt from the article is given below

At present, a few countries have laws to regulate lobbying.  These include Australia, Canada, US, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Slovenia, Israel and Taiwan.  Other countries such as France, Spain, Portugal, India and Japan do not have any such law while UK and Ireland regulate the lobbied.

Although India currently does not regulate lobbying, it is likely to move toward that direction.  Before the government drafts a law, it is essential to get clarity on the activities sought to be regulated and sanctioned.  In this article, we explore how other countries have defined lobbying, the mechanism they adopted to regulate these activities and the lessons India could learn from their experience.

How expensive is corruption? Public Administration I

1 Jun

Every instance where corruption is a topic of discussion revolves around one central question (apart from the obvious immorality of it):  How much does corruption cost society as a whole?  I recently picked up a book in an order to understand the process of public administration better.  Its preface gave at least one, objective estimate as an answer to the question.

The book Public Administration and Public Affairs (By Nicholas Henry) introduces the subject of public administration by justifying how important governments and the bureaucracy are to society.  He points out that though critiques argue that “the best government is the least government”, there are some good governments do good things which are fundamental to human dignity, security and happiness.

He however qualifies this by saying that people equally long for good government (In a global poll, it was found that political corruption is third in people’s minds, after AIDS and crime as a “very big” problem).  He then states the following:

1. According to the World Bank, global corruption costs an estimated US$ 2.3 trillion every year.

2. Political corruption appears to inflate the prices of goods by as much as 15 to 20 percent.

3. Societies with “pervasively corrupt governments” must bribe officials up to an additional 3 to 10 percent of the cost of government services.

4. Countries seen as corrupt have lower levels of foreign investment.  On the other hand, countries with low corruption have higher social indicators.

Of course, these points only give some sort of quantification to the cost of corruption in society.  A larger cost of corruption is the sheer disenchantment it creates within society.  Enough examples of corruption and nepotism abound in India which make this point clear.

The obvious point then is – If costs of corruption can be quantified, why are even strong and upright leaders (rare as they may be) unable to combat corruption?  My argument is that merely being tough on corruption is not enough.  One leader may have a zero tolerance policy on corruption, but that in itself is not enough.  Corrupt people will readily re-surface after the demise of such persons from the political and administrative landscape.  The answer lies in creating a more effective way of organising our government.

The organisation of the government must be such as to reduce an official’s incentive to be corrupt.  This can be a combination of increasing salaries, of ensuring merit-based promotions, of creating expertise within different spheres of administration, and also of ensuring better administrative support for decision-making officials.  There are two other things that must be done: (a) increasing the number of people at the right levels of government where there is a current shortage, while reducing excess numbers at other levels, and (b) creating an effective forum for resolving disputes related to the administration quickly.  Sadly, such steps themselves are going to be opposed most firmly by those already entrenched in their domains of influence.

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